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ABSTRACT
This Article tells the legal story of one of the South’s most infamous trials – the
Groveland Boys prosecution in central Florida. Called “Florida’s Little Scottsboro,”
the Groveland case garnered international attention in 1949 when four young black
men were accused of the gang rape of a white woman in the orange groves north of
Orlando. Several days of rioting, Ku Klux Klan activity, three murders, two trials,
and three death penalty verdicts followed, in what became the most infamous trial in
Florida history. The appeals of the trial reached the United States Supreme Court,
with the NAACP’s Thurgood Marshall serving as lead defense counsel in the re-trial
of the case. The case reads like a Hollywood movie, but with the underpinnings of a
classic 20th century southern courtroom drama.
This Article looks not only at the history of the Groveland prosecutions, but
undertakes a legal analysis of the trial court decisions made by the trial judge. While
the historiographical narrative of the Groveland trials is one of racism and a “legal
lynching,” many of the legal decisions made by the trial court were, in fact,
surprisingly consistent with legal precedent of the time. Nevertheless, the tragic
outcome of the Groveland case inflicted a permanent scar on the reputation of the
Florida criminal justice system.
AUTHOR NOTE
The author is a 2002 law school graduate of the University of Alabama, and has
worked over 12 years as a state prosecutor, with most of that time spent in the
office’s Sex Crimes and Special Victims’ Unit. The author would like to thank his
wife, his parents, his academic committee at the University of Florida, and the
Department of History—Drs. Spillane, Dale, and Davis.
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The case presents one of the best examples of one
of the worst menaces to American justice.1

O

n July 16, 1949, on a desolate road in rural central Florida, a
white woman claimed she was raped by four black men. Norma
Lee Padgett and her husband Willie Haven Padgett were driving on
Florida State Road 50 towards Groveland, Florida, having come from
a dance in Clermont, when Willie stopped the car on a deserted stretch
of darkened road, surrounded by the orange groves of Lake County.
The truth of what happened next will forever remain one of Florida’s
greatest legal mysteries. According to Willie and Norma Lee, the
couple began experiencing car troubles, and four black men stopped to
help them. Allegedly, the men overpowered Willie and drove off into
the groves with Norma Lee. When they stopped the car at a secluded
location, each of the four men took turns raping Norma Lee in the
backseat of their car, at gunpoint. When they had finished, she
claimed, the four men drove off, leaving her to wander through the
orange trees until she found help. The national and international press
called the “crime”2 that Norma and Willie concocted3 a farce.4 Locals
called it the worst crime in Lake County’s history.5 In the wake of the
allegations came riots, burnings, trials, appeals, and murders.
In spite of its front-page news status, for nearly 65 years the story
of the Groveland Boys has been a story as much in search of a voice,
as it has been a story in search of the truth. Perhaps kept out of the
limelight by a state overly concerned with its tourist image, and only
covered sparingly by historians 6 and journalists. 7 Florida’s most
1
2

3

4

5

6

Shepherd v. Florida, 31 U.S. 50, 55 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
James W. Ivey, Florida’s Little Scottsboro: Groveland, 56 CRISIS 266, 268
(1949) (quotation marks used by the original source).
See id. at 285-86 (explaining local suspicion centered around the rumor that
Norma Lee and Willie Padgett created this rape story to hide the fact that Willie
had battered Norma Lee; or to hide the fact that Norma Lee had been having a
sexual affair with a black man).
Ramona Lowe, Judge Whittles as Three Fight Death, CHI. DEFENDER, Sept. 10,
1949, at 3.
Mabel Norris-Reese, The True ‘Groveland Story’ Will be Told in This Week’s
Life, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, July 28, 1949, at 1.
See generally BEN GREEN, BEFORE HIS TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HARRY T.
MOORE, AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MARTYR. (Free Press 1999); GILBERT
KING, THE DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND
BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA (Harper Perennial 2012).
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sensational trial has yet to be analyzed through a legal lens. Even after
two trials and two appeals, the majority opinion in the United States
Supreme Court’s only review of the Groveland matter consists of just
eight words.8 This Article seeks to step past the Bar and look behind
the Bench at this truly remarkable legal drama. It can hardly be said
that the sad results of the Groveland trials were surprising. No doubt,
these defendants were foredoomed.9 To that end, this Article does not
attempt to make any further social, moral, or political comment on the
embarrassing depravities of a legal system based on the white
supremacy of central Florida in 1949. Such works undoubtedly exist in
deservedly countless numbers based on similar cases and locations
throughout the American South. Rather, this Article attempts to
examine the legal rulings, strategic motivations, procedural rules, and
court precedents in place at the time of these trials, to bring to light the
failures and successes of the lawyers and judges involved in this
matter. Contrary to modern conventional wisdom, the majority of the
rulings made by the trial judge in the case of the Groveland Boys—
whether motivated by legal acumen, racism, justice, or luck—proved
to be correct under the law of the day. While many of these rulings
would not stand the test of time or our current understandings of
justice and race relations, they were, in their time, correct. It is to these
applications of the law, many of which may sting the modern legal ear,
that we now turn our attention.
PART I: THE CASE
The Groveland Trouble
Modern writers say the Groveland trouble was about citrus – not
race, or sex.10 An all-black town11 in Lake County, Florida, just west
of Orlando, Groveland was built around a sharecropper mentality
which had been in place since the end of the Civil War. For wages of
7

8

9
10
11

See GARY CORSAIR, THE GROVELAND FOUR: THE SAD SAGA OF A LEGAL
LYNCHING (1st Books 2004).
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 50 (1951) (“Per Curiam. The judgment is
reversed. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282.”).
Brief for Petitioners at 19, Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1950).
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 110.
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 65 (Per local segregation laws, blacks were not
permitted to live in the nearby, all white, town of Mascotte, Florida).
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fifteen cents a day, the white grove owners in Mascotte counted on the
black citizens of Groveland to pick their citrus crops, fertilize their
trees, and perform the many hard tasks of maintaining the groves that
supported the profitable citrus industries of central Florida.12 Whites
comprised roughly sixty percent of the local population, and they
tolerated their black neighbors as long as they continued to work in
white-owned citrus groves. 13 Under this rigid system of racial
oppression14 few blacks owned their own homes,15 and this de facto
sharecropper system created a debilitating condition of dependency16
that cruelly entangled both races.
In the years following the Second World War, black soldiers
returned to Groveland only to find it exactly as Jim Crow had left it.17
Having served in the United States military, and having seen indelible
examples of racial horrors and harmonies, returning black soldiers
were considerably less acquiescent to this labor system.18 It was into
this society that local black residents Walter Irvin and Samuel
Shepherd returned, following their dishonorable discharges from the
United States Army and their return from the war in Europe. 19 Not
wanting to work in the orange groves, Irvin and Shepherd tried odd
jobs in nearby Orlando, strutting the main street of Groveland proudly
wearing their Army uniforms. Considered uppity, or smart niggers,20
12

13

14
15

16
17
18
19

20

Steven F. Lawson et al., Groveland: Florida’s Little Scottsboro, 65 FLA. HIST.
Q. 1, 2 (1986).
KING, supra note 6, at 96-97 (referencing a study done on the local Lake County
economy in the wake of the Groveland affair by British economist Terence
McCarthy).
Lawson, supra note 12, at 1.
See CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 39; see also KING, supra note 6, at 97 (noting that
Groveland defendant Samuel Shepherd’s father, Henry, was one of the few
black grove owners in the area—a fact that made the Shepherd family resented
among local whites).
Lawson, supra note 12, at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 4. Irvin and Shepherd were court martialed for misappropriation of
government property, and dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Army. Id.
See Ivey, supra note 2, at 266 (adding further to the local white community’s
scorn of Sammie Shepherd, his father was a rare Negro success story in
Groveland, and he not only owned his own house, but owned his own small
grove).
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they were immediately approached by Lake County Sheriff, Willis V.
McCall and ordered to remove their uniforms and take their places in
the groves where they belonged. 21 They refused. When Norma Lee
Padgett alleged rape at the hands of four unknown black men on July
16, 1949, Sheriff McCall already had his two prime suspects in mind,
and they were quickly arrested. Two other young black men, Charles
Greenlee and Ernest Thomas, were rumored around town to be
involved in the popular but illegal lottery games known as bolita or
Cuba. 22 Sheriff McCall, again seizing an opportunity, arrested
Greenlee and chased Thomas into a cypress swamp near the Georgia
border. Once located, Ernest Thomas was shot and killed ’while
resisting arrest.23
Lake County, Florida, like much of the American South, adhered
to a strict paradigm of chivalry, which was viewed as necessary for the
maintenance of racial control. As Steven F. Lawson, professor of
history at the University of South Florida and perhaps the leading
authority on the Groveland story, explains:
The protection of southern white womanhood justified
racial control. However questionable in specific cases,
the word and sexual morality of southern daughters
were considered equally pure. The fear of rape and the
threat of menacing blacks provided a potent rationale
for keeping all Negroes in their subordinate place.24
Thus, as Gilbert King argues, this southern rape complex had
nothing to do immediately with sex, but rather an internal southern
fear that any advancement by the black race, beyond its currently
limited social situation, might allow blacks to one day advance far
enough to lay claim to complete equality.25 Following Norma Lee’s
allegations, southern white womanhood, and the Lake County way of
life, was under attack. A racial battle whose ferocity would be nearly
unmatched in American history was about to be waged in Groveland.
To pursue this racial attack the whites of the Lake County would
rely on the same justifications their grandfathers relied upon, and the
21
22
23
24
25

Lawson, supra note 12, at 3.
KING, supra note 6, at 114-15.
Id. at 117.
Lawson, supra note 12, at 25.
KING, supra note 6, at 52.
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same justifications that whites all across the American South had been
utilizing since the first days that Africans and Europeans shared space
on this continent. As phrased by Ida B. Wells, the excuse of the
protection of white womanhood was “used to justify their own [white]
barbarism.” 26 Thus, beginning the day after Norma Lee Padgett
claimed rape, insensate, intolerant whites27 from all over Florida and
the South, brittle with tension and vengeance,28 converged on this little
“festering bowels”29 in Lake County. Traffic patterns were affected as
far away as Jacksonville with vehicles bound for Groveland. 30 An
angry white mob burned black homes in Groveland — including the
home of Samuel Shepherd’s father31 — and shot into several others.
Black residents fled to Orlando or took refuge by hiding in the orange
groves. Over 300 National Guardsmen and the 118th U.S. Army Field
Artillery Unit were deployed to help quell the three-day reign of terror.
The leading local paper, The Mount Dora Topic, defended the mobs
actions by writing, “the mobs didn’t just wantonly burn Negro homes
in wild vengeance for the crime. No – it was a cunning mob . . . the
mob burned the homes of a Negro engaged in voodoo, and another
who ran a Bolita game.”32 When the mob arrived at the Lake County
Jail in Tavares demanding that the Sheriff hand over the suspects,
Sheriff McCall hid his prisoners in the groves to prevent what surely
would have been a lynching. The local press proclaimed Sheriff
McCall earned a badge of honor for his handling of the mobs.33 The
26

27
28
29
30
31

32

33

DANIELLE L. MCGUIRE, AT THE DARK END OF THE STREET: BLACK WOMEN,
RAPE, AND RESISTANCE – A NEW HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
FROM ROSA PARKS TO THE RISE OF BLACK POWER, at xvii (Vintage Books
2010) (referencing a quote by Ida B. Wells, editor of the Memphis Free Press).
Ivey supra note 2, at 266.
Lowe, supra note 4, at 3.
Ivey supra note 2, at 266.
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 59.
See KING, supra note 6, at 97 (referencing Terence McCarthy’s study indicating
that the whites of Lake County were less interested in seeking revenge for the
rape of Norma Padgett than in seeing the demise of ‘all independent colored
farmers’).
Norris-Reese, supra note 5, at 1. Bolita was a popular lottery game within the
local black communities that drew much of Sheriff McCall’s wrath because it
involved illegal gambling.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Honor Will Be Avenged, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, July 21,
1949, at 4.
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stories of the violence in Groveland spread quickly, making headlines
in national and international papers the next day.34 Before the last of
the house fires had smoldered out, Groveland was already being called
“the Florida Terror,”35 and “Florida’s Little Scottsboro.”36
There were no shortages of horrifying comparisons for the national
media to make. The sad truth of the matter was that Groveland was
hardly unique. From Elaine, Arkansas to Scottsboro, Alabama, the
southern race riot, fueled by allegations of black on white rape, was
tragically common. Historian Danielle McGuire opines that
“[u]nsubstantiated rumors of black men attacking innocent white
women sparked almost 50 percent of all race riots in the United States
between Reconstruction and World War II.” 37 To quell these riots,
there seemed only two options: a lengthy and painful occupation by
the local National Guard, or a quick trial followed by the imposition of
the death penalty for the accused. As Gilbert King, the Pulitzer Prize
winning author of Devil in the Grove writes, “[i]n the South the
bargain between justice and the public was implicit: an expeditious
trial with swift punishment by death or else a riot and lynching.”38
Lynching was a very real concern for the black population of Florida.
Since 1900, in the decades preceding the Groveland Case, Florida was
home to the nation’s highest per capita lynching rate. With a rate of
4.5 deaths by lynching for every 10,000 blacks, Florida’s lynching rate
was double that of Mississippi and three times greater than that of
Alabama. 39 With the National Guard already encamped outside
Groveland, and with an intimate knowledge of Florida’s violent
tendencies, Sheriff McCall spared the lives of his prisoners and
prepared to make them available for their expeditious trial.40 In sum,
34
35
36

37
38
39
40

See Lawson, supra note 12, at 2.
GREEN, supra note 6, at 7.
“Florida’s Little Scottsboro” references the 1931 Alabama prosecution of nine
young black boys for the alleged rape of two white women while on a train
southbound from Chattanooga, Tennessee through the northeastern Alabama
town of Scottsboro. The trials and appeals of that case have long been
considered a dark chapter in American race relations, and a widely accepted low
point in American legal history. See Lawson, supra note 12, at 7.
MCGUIRE, supra note 26, at 22.
KING, supra note 6, at 137.
GREEN, supra note 6, at 45.
GREEN, supra note 6, at 7 (arguing McCall and the local white power machinery
likely protected the Groveland defendants from lynching because the negative
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as the British observer Terence McCarthy sadly noted, the Groveland
Boys were simply being offered up as a legal blood-sacrifice in an
effort to spare the remainder of the local black community from
further violence.41
Spoon-Fed, One-Sided Reporting
With pens in hand and typewriters in tow, the national and local
press came to Lake County to cover the events that would comprise
one of the greatest race trials in American history. The national media
was represented in Groveland by six major media outlets: The New
York Times, The Chicago Defender, Time, Life, The Christian Science
Monitor, and The New Leader. Of these, the articles written in the New
York Times and The Chicago Defender are of particular importance to
the historiography of Groveland, but perhaps just as much for their
authors as for their content. The New York Times had sent its only
black reporter, Ted Poston, to cover the Groveland story.42 Poston was
uniquely qualified to cover Groveland, since he had covered the 1931
trial of the Scottsboro Boys in Alabama, and had himself been a victim
of blackmail over a false rape allegation in the past. 43 He was
eventually nominated for the Pulitzer Prize for his articles on
Groveland.44 Similarly, black journalist Ramona Lowe of The Chicago
Defender was able to scoop several stories on the Groveland saga
since she was able to move and interview with relative ease in the
local black communities. She even rode back and forth to the
courthouse in the same car as the defense attorneys.45 Gary Corsair,
author of The Groveland Four: The Sad Saga of a Legal Lynching,
attributes Lowe’s investigative success to her being viewed by the
local black communities as a fellow black first, a woman second, and a
journalist third.46

41
42
43
44

45
46

press in the national media was already having an adverse effect on Florida’s
tourism industry, and any further violence would only bring increased pressure
upon the state).
KING, supra note 6, at 98.
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 66.
See id.
Id. at 380. Additionally, New York University later recognized Poston’s work
on Groveland as one of the top 100 works of journalism of the 20th Century. Id.
KING, supra note 6, at 175.
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 79.
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Drawing up the battle lines opposite the national media outlets in
Groveland were the three primary local newspapers: The Mount Dora
Topic, The Leesburg Commercial, and The Orlando Sentinel. 47 The
local authorities, namely State Attorney Jesse W. Hunter and Sheriff
McCall, used the Topic and the Commercial as their own private
trumpets for information on this drama of the South. 48 Not
surprisingly, many of these stories smacked of spoon-fed, one-sided
reporting.49 Like the national press, it was the personalities of the local
writers that drove the stories, and no local press personality was as
intriguing as the editor of the Mount Dora Topic, Ms. Mabel NorrisReese. A northerner by birth, Norris-Reese had emigrated to the South
in the years before Groveland, but she seemed to be a Southerner at
heart; she refused to sit at the media table in the Lake County
courtroom until the black journalists were forced to move at her
request and ultimately Judge Truman Futch’s order.50 Like the Times’
Poston, however, Norris-Reese’s work was also nominated for the
Pulitzer Prize.51
Clay-Eatin’ Crackers
The Florida Terror was making for big press in 1949, and it would
make for tragic history as well. Like much of history, distinct
personalities were at the center of these events, and the Groveland
story was long on colorful characters. At center stage sat the alleged
victim and prosecutrix, Norma Lee Padgett. The seventeen year-old
newlywed daughter of a respected, albeit poor, Lake County citrus
grower,52 Norma Lee held many secrets inside her slight, blond frame.
The girl that State Attorney Jesse Hunter referred to as that “poor, old,
47

48

49
50

51

52

The Mount Dora Topic and The Leesburg Commercial were published as
weekly papers. The Orlando Sentinel was a daily paper, published under two
separate titles through the Groveland saga—The Orlando Sentinel, and The
Orlando Morning Sentinel. The author will use the more common title, The
Orlando Sentinel, throughout this Article.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Lake County Awaits Governor’s Solemn End to
Groveland Story, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, May 18, 1950, at 1.
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 79.
See Lowe, supra note 4, at 3 (describing an instance where Norris-Reese refused
to sit at a table because there were three negroes present).
Lauren Ritchie, It Was Long Past Time to Omit McCall’s Name, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2007, at 1.
See Ivey, supra note 2, at 266.
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honest cracker girl”53 had married an older man, but married down in
station. Her husband, Willie Haven Padgett, was of the lowest stratum
of Southern white society. Referred to even by the Lake County locals
as a “clay-eatin’ cracker,”54 Willie was prone to alcohol and violence.
On the date of this offense, the couple was not living together due to
marital problems.55 It was rumored that domestic violence, infidelity,
or both were to blame.56 Such rumors of infidelity even came in the
form of an affair between Norma Lee and Groveland defendant
Samuel (“Sammie”) Shepherd.57
Ernest Thomas, a friend of both Samuel Shepherd and Walter
Irvin, was also in town on the night of July 16, 1949. Thomas was in
Groveland to work in a local bolita game that night, but he was not
with Shepherd or Irvin at any point in the evening. He was with
Charles Greenlee, a sixteen year old from Gainesville who came to
Groveland to meet Thomas about the bolita game. 58 Greenlee was
never in the area of the alleged rape that night,59 and when Norma Lee
and Willie had a chance to identify him as one of the assailants, they
both indicated he was not one of the four.60 Regardless, Greenlee was
arrested for loitering, and Thomas fled toward the Georgia border.
Thomas was found by local law enforcement in Madison County,
Florida and was shot and killed.61 Four different types of ammunition
were identified in his body. 62 Norma Lee was driven to Madison
County to identify the deceased suspect. She confirmed Thomas was
one of the four.63
Even if Norma Lee had failed to implicate Ernest Thomas, as had
been the case with Charles Greenlee, it may not have mattered to Lake
53

54
55

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Mabel Norris-Reese, Groveland Story May Give High Court New Decision to
Make, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Feb. 21, 1952, at 1.
Ivey supra note 2, at 285.
Trial transcript at 311, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed to Marion Cty.)
(on file with author).
KING, supra note 6, at 224-25.
See generally KING, supra note 6, at 35.
Lawson, supra note 12, at 8.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 4.
See KING, supra note 6, at 118.
See Lawson, supra note 12, at 4.
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County Sheriff Willis V. McCall. A good ole boy type sheriff, straight
out of central casting,64 McCall seemed a precursor of Birmingham’s
Bull Connor.65 During his twenty-seven year tenure as sheriff of Lake
County, 66 McCall was investigated for civil rights violations thirtyeight times—but was never convicted of any. 67 An FBI informant
would later confirm McCall was an active member of the Ku Klux
Klan’s Apopka, Florida Klavern.68 While the national press reviled the
Lake County sheriff, 69 the local press sang his praises. Referencing
McCall’s involvement in the Groveland case, Mabel Norris-Reese
wrote that he spent night and day working on the case,70 and “the full
story of his bravery . . . will never be told.” 71 While McCall was
certainly subject to divergent viewpoints, what was clear was that he
understood his constituency. McCall had originally made a name for
himself as a union buster while an agent with the U.S. Agricultural
Commission, and from his time at the USAC he had developed little
patience for blacks that chose not to work in the groves. If there was
one thing McCall perhaps policed more than idle blacks, it was their
illicit bolita rings.72 So when McCall needed four black suspects to
firm up Norma Lee Padgett’s rape allegations, the idle and uppity
Samuel Shepherd and Walter Irvin, and the bolita-involved Charles
Greenlee and Ernest Thomas, would close the investigation nicely.

64

65
66

67
68
69

70

71

72

Jonathan L. Entin, Litigation, Political Mobilization and Social Reform:
Insights from Florida’s Pre-Brown Civil Rights Era, 52 FLA. L. REV. 497, 501
(Apr. 2000) (reviewing BEN GREEN, BEFORE HIS TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
HARRY T. MOORE, AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MARTYR (Free Press 1999)).
GREEN, supra note 6, at 12.
See id. at 51 (explaining that McCall served as sheriff of Lake County from
1944 to 1972).
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 379.
Id. at 30.
See, e.g., Sheriff McCall Shoots New Victim in Florida, CHI. DEFENDER, June 4,
1955, at 5. The national press kept Sheriff McCall in the news even three years
after the end of the Groveland cases with snide headlines such as this one.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Grand Jury Indicts Three Negroes in Groveland Case,
MOUNT DORA TOPIC, July 21, 1949, at 1.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Our Thanks, Gentlemen, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8,
1949, at 4.
KING, supra note 6, at 78.
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Sheriff McCall’s right hand man was Deputy Sheriff James Yates.
With front page photos captioned, “He Gets Evidence,” 73 and overthe-top headlines such as “Scotland Yard, Please Don’t Take Our
Yates,” 74 Yates was highly regarded in the local press for his
“remarkable police work that put evidence into the hands of the
State.”75 Not surprisingly, the national press saw him quite differently.
The most infamous and notably remarkable police work he was
responsible for was a series of plaster foot-casts taken at the rape scene
that conclusively linked defendant Walter Irvin to the scene. The
Groveland defense team strongly suspected the casts were a fake, and
in a separate 1962 case, Yates was federally indicted for making
forged plaster foot-casts in order to assist in framing a defendant.76
The Groveland trials would be prosecuted by the elected State
Attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Florida, the Honorable Jesse
W. Hunter. Now seventy years old, Hunter had passed the Florida bar
exam having never attended law school. 77 He was sworn into the
Florida Bar in 1913, alongside his lifelong friend, Circuit Judge
Truman Futch.78 The national press called Hunter a tireless, cigarette
smoking,79 folksy character with a cracker barrel wit.80 He referred to
the Groveland defendants as “niggers” throughout the course of the
case. 81 To his friend Mabel Norris-Reese, the editor of the local

73

74

75
76

77
78

79
80
81

Mabel Norris-Reese, He Gets Evidence, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 1949, at
1.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Scotland Yard, Please Don’t Take Our Yates, MOUNT
DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 1949, at 1. Norris-Reese subsequently writes, “Should
Scotland Yard hear of Deputy Sheriff James L. Yates and his work on ‘the
Groveland Story,’ then Lake County might be out a deputy.” Id.
Norris-Reese, supra note 71, at 4.
See Jack Greenberg, War Stories: Reflections on Thirty-Five Years with the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 587, 593 (1994).
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 50.
Mabel Norris-Reese, At Long Last, the Groveland Story is Put into Production,
MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 1949, at 1.
Lowe, supra note 4, at 3.
Lawson, supra note 12, at 17.
Lowe, supra note 4, at 3.
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weekly newspaper The Mount Dora Topic, the sage and trial trained82
Hunter, was Lake County’s “Dean of Law.”83
The defense of the 1949 Groveland Three84 was conducted by Alex
Akerman, Jr. of Orlando. The only Republican in the Florida
legislature, Akerman had made his reputation as a civil rights liberal
when he filed a desegregation lawsuit on behalf of Virgil Hawkins
against the University of Florida in Gainesville. In sum, he was the
only white Florida attorney the National Association for the Advance
of Colored People (NAACP) could find who was willing to accept the
case.85
Akerman was assisted in the first Groveland trial by Franklin
Williams, a black New York lawyer from the NAACP’s Legal
Defense Fund. Upon stepping foot in the courtroom in Tavares,
Williams became the first black attorney to practice law in Lake
County.86 The colored attorney possessed a “clipped northern accent,
answered questions with a cold hardness, 87 and had a “complete
bitterness in [his] eyes,” wrote the Topic.88 To the editor of the Topic,
Williams personified the racial question.89 Under an article featuring
Williams, the Topic printed a photo on the front page with the
inexplicable caption, “Was it Hate?” underneath.90 Franklin Williams
was trying the Groveland cases on enemy soil.
The biggest trial in Florida history would be tried before the
Honorable Truman G. Futch, circuit court judge for the fifth judicial
circuit of Florida. Like his lifelong friend Jesse Hunter, Futch never
82
83

84

85
86
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Norris-Reese, supra note 33, at 4.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Elmo Roper May Prove Length of Leaf, But Not Hunter’s
Ability, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, February 14, 1952, at 1.
The 1949 “Groveland Three” trial in Lake County (Tavares, Florida) involved
defendants Samuel Shepherd, Walter Irvin, and Charles Greenlee. Defendant
Ernest Thomas was deceased, but his name still appeared on the indictment.
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 93.
Id. at 105. Williams, a black man without a Florida Bar card, was allowed to
assist with the case only because State Attorney Hunter asked that his son be
sworn in as his assistant at the same trial. Id.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Attorney Williams Expresses His Views on ‘Faults of the
South,’ MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 1949, at 1.
Mabel Norris-Reese, When History Records, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8,
1949, at 4.
Id.
Id. at 1.
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attended law school,91 but he passed the bar exam with Hunter in 1913
after a self-taught legal education. 92 The national press dubbed him
“The Whittler,” for his incessant practice of whittling fence chips into
toothpicks during the trial, and Ramona Lowe of The Chicago
Defender added to the legend with the Nero-esque article headline,
“Judge Whittles While Three Fight Death.” 93 Meanwhile, the local
press described Futch as at ease on the bench . . . attentive to every
word, and completely fair and unbiased.94 The transcripts of the trials
would both refute and acknowledge such praise.
With the players and press assembled in Tavares, the county seat
of Lake County, State Attorney Hunter convened a grand jury on July
20, 1949. In spite of the fact that Norma Lee and Willie Padgett had
failed to originally implicate Charles Greenlee in this offense, and the
fact that Ernest Thomas had been killed during his capture in north
Florida, the four names of Samuel Shepherd, Walter Irvin, Charles
Greenlee, and Ernest Thomas appeared before a Lake County grand
jury for indictment on the charge of capital rape. All four indictments
were returned. Mabel Norris-Reese, editor of The Mount Dora Topic,
proclaimed that the hasty call of the grand jury “bespeaks of the
caliber of the county’s law enforcement officers.”95
With the quick return of the indictments and the setting of a trial
date just over one month out, the local press went into high gear. The
harsh pretrial publicity they generated would constitute a major factor
in the United States Supreme Court’s review of the trial.96 For starters,
The Leesburg Commercial, using information likely provided by
Sheriff McCall, ran a story confidently detailing the fact that two of
the three defendants had confessed while in custody, but failed to
discuss how these alleged confessions might have been obtained. 97
91
92
93
94
95
96
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CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 50.
Norris-Reese, supra note 78, at 1.
Lowe, supra note 4, at 3.
Norris-Reese, supra note 71, at 4.
Norris-Reese, supra note 33, at 4.
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951). While the 1949 trial was reversed on
the basis of the improper selection of the county grand jury under Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950), Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion focused on the
negative pretrial publicity as an additional and equal ground warranting reversal.
See 341 U.S. at 50-54.
See Lawson, supra note 12, at 8 (“From a meeting with Irvin, Shepherd, and
Greenlee [defense attorney Franklin Williams] learned that despite the sheriff’s
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Having absorbed Lake County’s opening salvo, the Groveland defense
team responded in kind, mostly to the northern and black press, as
NAACP attorney Franklin Williams made various impermissible press
releases of his own.98 Likely a result of ignorance, or perhaps shrewd
calculation, the Lake County local press began utilizing the full name
of the rape victim, 99 in clear violation of Florida law. 100 Seemingly
skeptical of the formalities of a trial, The Orlando Sentinel wrote,
“[w]e’ll wait and see what the law does, and if the law doesn’t do it
right, we’ll do it.” 101 Having considerably more confidence in Lake
County’s brand of justice, Norris-Reese penned an article in The
Mount Dora Topic on the day after the indictments, entitled “Honor
Must Be Avenged.” In it she stated, “a sorry thing happened to that
young couple . . . their honor must be avenged. And it will be.
Revenge will be accomplished by a more frightening and awful means
than a mob has at its command.”102 Although the Topic’s reference to

98

99

100

101
102

announcement that the accused had admitted their guilt, they had been badly
beaten by the deputies until they had agreed to confess. Their story was
corroborated when an examination completed by Williams several days after
their arrest revealed numerous cuts and bruises all over their bodies . . .
Jefferson Elliot, [Florida] Governor [Fuller] Warren’s special investigator, told
him that it was evident from the wounds and scars on Green, Irvin, and
Shepherd ‘that they had been beaten around the clock.’ Even so, Irvin had
refused to admit his guilt.”); see also Shepherd, 341 U.S. at 52 (1951) (J.
Jackson, concurring) (“But neither counsel nor court can control the admission
of evidence if unproven, and probably unprovable, confessions are put before
the jury by newspapers and radio. . . It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial
influence than a press release by the officer of the court charged with the
defendants’ custody stating that they had confessed, and here just such a
statement, unsworn to, unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was
conveyed by the press to the jury.”).
See Answer to Application for Removal of Cause at 2, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla.
1952) (removed to Marion Cty.) (on file with author). Williams stated the
defendants were innocent and indicated local racial motives were driving the
case. Id.
The use of the victim’s full name by the local press may have been a result of
simple ignorance of the applicable Florida statute, or may have stemmed from a
desire to educate the potential jury as to the identity of the victim and her family,
as her family was reasonably well thought of within the community.
FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1949); FLA. STAT. § 794.04 (1949) (declaring the
publication of a rape victim’s name unlawful, and imposing a misdemeanor of
the first degree as the sanction).
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 17, 1949, at 1.
Norris-Reese, supra note 33, at 4.
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the death penalty might have been (more) subtle, The Orlando Sentinel
was frighteningly less so when they published a full color, front page
cartoon of four empty electric chairs and the words, “No Compromise
– Supreme Penalty.”103 This ill-humored cartoon would form the final
straw in the United States Supreme Court’s reversal of the Lake
County tragedy.104
May God Rest Your Soul
On September 2, 1949 the trial of the State of Florida versus
Shepherd, Irvin, Greenlee, and Thomas 105 was set to commence in
Lake County circuit court. As a row of white reporters snapped
photos—Judge Futch did not allow the black media to take any
pictures—an all-white, all male Lake County jury heard two days of
testimony. 106 Although Willie and Norma Lee Padgett’s testimony
differed on some of the details of the case,107 Norma Lee proved a
much better witness than the defense had anticipated. Fearing a black
attorney may be seriously injured or killed if he rose to cross examine
a white woman in front of a white jury, the NAACP’s legal
heavyweights of Franklin Williams — and later Thurgood Marshall —
were sidelined in favor of their white co-counsel. 108 It was the
relatively inexperienced, but local and white, Alex Akerman, Jr. who
was given the thankless task of handling the details of the Groveland
defense. But even as a white attorney, he was greatly limited in his
ability to put forth a viable defense. From the outset, the defense team
was significantly hampered by the fact that southern courtroom
decorum essentially required them to limit their defense to that of
mistaken identity. The defense team was sadly forced into the
unenviable position of conceding that Norma Lee Padgett had been
103
104

105
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107
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ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 19, 1949, at 1.
See id.; see also Shepherd, 341 U.S. at 53 (acknowledging that although the
1949 trial was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court on the basis of improper
grand jury selection, Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurring opinion made clear
he believed such negative pretrial publicity would also have warranted reversal).
Ernest Thomas’ name, although deceased, still appeared on the indictment, the
court docket, and on the trial transcripts.
Lowe, supra note 4, at 3.
See, e.g., Ivey, supra note 2, at 268. Willie and Norma Lee Padgett differed at
times on whether there were three or four possible assailants, but as Ivey writes,
“the white woman had said four, so four it must be.” Id.
KING, supra note 6, at 299.
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raped — in spite of reasonable evidence to the contrary — and only
arguing that the defendants were not the true offenders. As Gilbert
King states, “[t]he defense dared not to question in any way . . . the
purity of the Flower of Southern Womanhood . . . So the only
practicable strategy for the defense in the Groveland Boys case was to
raise reasonable doubt by showing that the state of Florida had arrested
the wrong men.” 109 Raising such a doubt, in such a climate, would
prove an impossible task.
The homegrown and folksy State Attorney Jesse Hunter also
proved a much tougher adversary than the defense team had expected.
Perhaps his shrewdest legal maneuver of the three year court drama
was seen in the evidence he did not seek to put in, rather that the
evidence he did. Namely, when Hunter declined to offer any evidence
of the defendants’ questionable jailhouse confessions, he cut the legs
from underneath the defendants’ most anticipated course of argument.
Namely, the defense team had planned to introduce testimony from a
Jacksonville doctor and dentist who had examined the defendants at
Florida State Prison, and who were prepared to testify to the
substantial amount of torture and physical abuse the defendants had
suffered while in the custody of the Lake County Sheriff’s Office.
However, when Hunter astutely decided not to introduce any evidence
of the confessions, the circumstances surrounding them became legally
irrelevant. With the law enforcement and medical portions of the trial
left out, the evidence phase of the capital rape trial of the three
Groveland defendants would take only two days to complete.
After the evidence was presented, both sides made their final
arguments, and when the jury left the courtroom to deliberate Judge
Futch took Hunter’s hand, shook it, and said, “I have never heard a
better argument in all my life.”110 Judge Futch was confident in his
fellow Lake County jurymen, and he knew the defendants were guilty
when the jury filed out.111 Mabel Norris-Reese noted that even Charles
Greenlee’s father’s own eyes, showed doubt of his son’s innocence.112
Verdict form in hand and hardly needing to read it, Judge Futch
imposed a life sentence upon the juvenile Charles Greenlee, and coldly
pronounced a sentence of death in the electric chair for Walter Irvin
109
110
111
112

Id. at 307.
Norris-Reese, supra note 78, at 1.
Id.
Id.
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and Samuel Shepherd. In announcing the sentences of the court, Judge
Futch said simply, “May God rest your soul.”113
Picking on Very Small Potatoes
The most publicized trial in Florida history had cost the citizens of
Lake County upwards of $5,000.00, but the local press proclaimed, the
county can well be proud of the results.114 The national press saw the
results differently. Claiming the defense faced virtually every legal
obstacle imaginable, the national press called the trial “a legal
lynching” of three innocent men. 115 Ramona Lowe of The Chicago
Defender claimed the proceeding was a trial of gossip led by a white
supremacist judge, and the only crime committed by the defendants
was that of being negro.116 Now, Lake County would have to wait and
see whether the NAACP would derail the plot of the corrupt story by
use of the appellate process. 117 Lake County’s citizens feared the
verdict and sentence of September 3, 1949 would hardly be the end of
the Groveland saga.
As anticipated, the residents of Lake County did not have to wait
long to have their fears confirmed. The NAACP quickly announced an
appeal on behalf of defendants Irvin and Shepherd. The juvenile
Charles Greenlee decided not to appeal since he did not receive the
death penalty. On May 16, 1950 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
convictions and the headlines in Lake County proclaimed, “Justice
Triumphs.”118 Justice Roy Chapman, writing for a unanimous Florida
Supreme Court, said, “the trial showed conclusively that harmony and
good will existed between the white and colored races.”119 Seizing on
Justice Chapman’s shortsightedness, Mabel Norris-Reese wrote, “Lake
County was right, and its accusers wrong . . . the NAACP can now
leave well enough alone.”120 The NAACP would do no such thing.
113
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Mabel Norris-Reese, Torch Dies Out for Greenlee as Appeals Are Set For
Companions, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 15, 1949, at 1.
Norris-Reese, supra note 71, at 4.
Ivey, supra note 2, at 268.
Lowe, supra note 4, at 3.
Norris-Reese, supra note 48, at 1.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Justice Triumphs, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, May 18, 1950, at
4.
Shepherd v. Florida, 46 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 1950).
Norris-Reese, supra note 118, at 4.
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Nearly one year later, on April 9, 1951, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the convictions in the case of Shepherd v. Florida,121
and this time the national press took its turn to proclaim Justice in
Groveland. 122 While the opinion overturned the convictions
unanimously on the basis of improper grand jury selection procedures,
Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote a pointed concurring opinion in which
he argued that improper pretrial publicity in the local press could have
also constituted a basis for reversal.123 The case was remanded back to
Lake County, and the national press—using a different label for the
word victim—exclaimed, “the NAACP has won a new trial for the
victims of this notorious miscarriage of justice.” 124 The Crisis, a
magazine published by the NAACP, agreed with Justice Jackson when
it wrote that the local press played an odious part in preventing a fair
and impartial trial.125 The Mount Dora Topic, itself a target of Justice
Jackson’s ire, fired back in an April 12, 1951 article entitled, “Final
Judging”:
[The United States Supreme Court] based their
decision entirely upon transcripts of the trial, upon the
headlines of newspapers and upon what the defense
counsel wanted them to know of the case . . . If it is
wrong for a newspaper to give full coverage to an event
such as the rape of a woman by four men at the point of
a gun, then it is wrong for a newspaper to give full
coverage to the rape of a county by an army of invaders
at the point of many guns . . . The judges picked on very
small potatoes . . . [They] should certainly not take
chances of starting the Civil War over again.126
A Strange Twist or a Slaughter
On November 6, 1951, the Groveland story would take a true turn
for the surreal. The case having now been set for a second trial per the
Supreme Court’s order, Sheriff Willis McCall was in the process of
121
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341 U.S. 50 (1951).
Justice in Groveland, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 1951, at 134.
Shepherd, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Edna Kerin, Another Chance for the Groveland Victims, CRISIS, May 1951, at
317.
Id.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Final Judging, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, April 12, 1951, at 4.

214

UMass Law Review

v. 11 | 194

transporting defendants Walter Irvin and Samuel Shepherd back to the
Lake County Jail from the Florida State Prison near Starke. Driving
southbound into Lake County on Florida State Road 19 near the Ocala
National Forest, Sheriff McCall claimed he suffered a flat tire and
ordered his two prisoners to change it. Once out of the car, McCall
states, the two prisoners, handcuffed together, attacked him with a
flashlight. Acting in self-defense, McCall shot both Irvin and
Shepherd, and then called Deputy James Yates to assist him.
According to Walter Irvin’s later account, when Deputy Yates arrived
Yates noticed Irvin was not dead, and after clearing a jam to his
service revolver, Deputy Yates shot Irvin again at close range. 127
Samuel Shepherd died at the scene, but Walter Irvin somehow
survived and relayed his account of the shooting to representatives of
the NAACP from his hospital bed in Eustis. 128 A Lake County
coroner’s inquest into the shooting exonerated Sheriff McCall,129 and
Judge Futch determined there was no need for a grand jury
investigation into the matter.130
In the local press, the shooting was only vaguely referenced, and
not even afforded headline status in The Mount Dora Topic.131 And
what the local press termed a new turn and a strange twist in the case,
the national press called a slaughter and a whitewash.132 The Crisis
127

128
129

130
131

132

Later FBI investigative analysis determined this second shot into Walter Irvin
was fired from close range, and at a directly downward angle. The bullet was
recovered in the clay directly below the spot where Irvin was laying. While this
evidence clearly supported Irvin’s version of the account, and should have
directly implicated McCall and Yates in a criminal act, the FBI never provided
this information to the defense due to its sensitive nature.
Walter Irvin’s Story of the Shooting, CRISIS, Dec. 1951, at 641.
The Lake County Shooting, CRISIS, Dec. 1951, at 637. Not a single witness called
at the eleven-hour coroner’s inquest had any relevant testimony to provide. Id.
The three witnesses who could have actually provided meaningful testimony—
namely Deputy Yates, Walter Irvin, and the Leesburg fire chief who heard the
initial radio reports were not called. Id.
Judge Closes Case in Slaying of Negro, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1951, at 17.
See, e.g., Mabel Norris-Reese, Despite New Turn in Lake’s Drama, There Was
Honor, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Nov. 8, 1951, at 1 (referencing the shooting);
Mabel Norris-Reese, Strange Twist to Groveland Story, MOUNT DORA TOPIC,
Nov. 8, 1951, at 1.
Ramona Lowe, Supreme Court May Act in Groveland Slaughter, CHI.
DEFENDER, Nov. 24, 1951, at 1; The Lake County Shooting, supra note 129, at
637.
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published a transcript of Walter Irvin’s hospital bed statement,
endorsed it as a true statement of what actually happened, 133 and
denounced the state of Florida for its determination “to whitewash the
whole affair.”134 The Mount Dora Topic dismissively described Irvin’s
account as bizarre.135
Writing thirty-five years after the event, Steven F. Lawson
theorized that Sheriff McCall planned to kill Irvin and Shepherd while
transporting them that night, because he thought that would be best for
Lake County. He wrote:
Initially [when he hid the defendants from the lynch
mob] McCall may have felt confident that the accused
would be sentenced to death . . . When the United States
Supreme Court overturned the case, however, McCall
probably began to have second thoughts. Having
promised the lynch mob and local residents that justice
would be done, McCall possibly decided on the road to
Tavares that the circumstances were convenient for him
to take summary action . . . [Local] fruit growers were
anxious for the issue to be settled because their black
workers were becoming afraid to go to work as the trial
approached. McCall may have thought that [this]
action would return the county more quickly to
normal.136
In reality, this act created anything but a return to normalcy.
Intense public outcry was led by the outspoken Florida chair of the
NAACP, Mr. Harry T. Moore. Moore had worked tirelessly raising
money throughout Florida to fund the Groveland Boys’ defense, and
after the shooting on State Road 19 Moore began pressuring the
governor and other state officials to remove McCall from office. Then,
on Christmas Eve 1951, Moore and his wife were killed by a bomb
placed under their bed at their home in Brevard County. Speaking for a
silent majority, historian and author James C. Clark argued that ’ a
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Walter Irvin’s Story, supra note 128, at 641.
The Lake County Shooting, supra note 129, at 637.
Mabel Norris-Reese, Irvin Sticks to Bizarre Story as He Awaits February 11,
MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Jan. 31, 1952, at 1.
Lawson, supra note 12, at 19.
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local Klansmen, at the behest of Sheriff McCall himself, carried out
Moore’s assassination.137
Now only Walter Irvin, alone and friendless,138 awaited his retrial.
That date would come on February 11, 1952 in Marion County,
Florida after Judge Futch granted the defense a change of venue
motion and moved the second trial of the case to Ocala.139 However,
since Marion County is also in Florida’s fifth judicial circuit, the
presiding judge and the state attorney did not change. And,
unfortunately for Walter Irvin, neither did the mindset or makeup of
the prospective jury pool.140
Now sitting at counsel table in the Marion County courthouse with
a defiant calm,141 Irvin awaited his inevitable fate. Orlando civil rights
attorney Alex Akerman, Jr. would again lead Irvin’s defense, but he
now had considerably more muscle on his team. Paul Perkins, a black
attorney from Daytona Beach was added, as were NAACP Legal
Defense Fund attorneys Jack Greenberg and Thurgood Marshall. The
addition of Marshall, who fifteen years later would become the first
black appointee to the United States Supreme Court, added true star
power to the defense team. Regardless of who tried the case for the
defense, theirs would be a tough row to hoe. For all the star power at
the defense table, they proved no match for Lake County’s dean of
law, State Attorney Jesse W. Hunter. 142 Hunter, who solemnly
informed the jury that because of a fatal malady this would be his last
major case as their elected prosecutor,143 also made quick work of the
new wrinkles in the defense’s case, perhaps more so because of his
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James C. Clark, Civil Rights Leader Harry T. Moore and the Ku Klux Klan in
Florida, 73 FLA. HIST. Q., Oct., 1999, at 166.
Norris-Reese, supra note 135, at 1.
See, e.g., Ramona Lowe, CHI. DEFENDER, Dec. 15, 1951, at 1. Defense counsel
had hoped to move the case out of Florida’s fifth judicial circuit entirely, but
Judge Futch refused that request. Id. Futch also denied motions to have State
Attorney Hunter removed from the case. Id.
See Stetson Kennedy, Ocala: Echo of Injustice, NATION, Mar. 1, 1952, at 20304. A public opinion poll taken in Marion County preceding the trial showed 43
per cent of those surveyed believed Walter Irvin was positively guilty. Id. at
204.
Norris-Reese, supra note 135, at 1.
Norris-Reese, supra note 53, at 1.
Florida Negro Given Chair on Rape Charge, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1952, at 7B.
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receptive audience than his own legal acumen.144 Taking no chances,
Hunter even flashed the Masonic hand signal for distress to the jurors
on several occasions throughout his closing,145 so as to further impress
upon them the importance of the meaning of their verdict to the central
Florida way of life. Following the same pattern as the first trial, Walter
Irvin’s retrial lasted just three days, and an all-white jury of his socalled peers left the courtroom to deliberate once again on the fate of a
Groveland defendant. When the jury returned less than two hours later,
needing only enough time to finish their cigars,146 the reading of the
verdicts was again a mere formality. On Valentine’s Day 1952, Judge
Futch once more sentenced Walter Irvin to death. Exasperated, the
national media called Irvin’s second death sentence in three years a
tragic plight.147
Undoubtedly, the Groveland case was a truly tragic affair, and
every stereotype and look of disappointment directed at the citizens of
central Florida was certainly deserved. The man at the center of the
storm was Judge Truman G. Futch, a self-taught southern lawyer who
was every bit the cracker as his constituents, and who was often
equally deserving of much of the derision aimed in their direction.
While the national media scoffed at the decision, noting Futch stopped
whittling long enough only to deny defendants’ requests,148 a thorough
legal analysis of the motions, briefs, and transcripts of the Groveland
trials evidences the simple fact that Judge Futch was correct in the
majority of his legal rulings throughout the two trials. Albeit the
application of local prejudice to the Groveland case was tragically
misguided and horribly wrong, Judge Futch’s application of the law to
144
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See, e.g., Mabel Norris-Reese, Irwin [sic] Defense Rests Case As Witness is
Belittled, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Feb. 14, 1952, at 1. The defense called two
witnesses at the second trial who did not testify at the first trial—the son of the
restaurant owner whom Norma Lee Padgett first contacted on State Road 50,
and a private detective from Miami who testified to Deputy Yates’ plaster shoe
cast evidence. Id. On cross examination, State Attorney Hunter discredited the
private detective by showing he was making $800.00 to testify in the case, and
his testimony was laughed out of the courtroom. Id. As for the son of the
restaurant owner, Hunter simply pointed out his failure to testify at the first trial,
and argued that the young man must have been confused or mistaken due to the
magnitude of the situation. Id.
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 332.
Id.
Kennedy, supra note 140, at 204.
Lowe, supra note 4, at 3.
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the Groveland trials was, for the most part, accurate. A reexamination
using the controlling legal standards of the first half of the 20th
century reveals much about the decisions and rulings of the whittling
judge who presided over Florida’s most notorious legal drama.
PART II: THE LAW
Judge and Jury Were Swept to the Fatal End
The first major decisions presented to Judge Futch came early in
the long history of the procedure of the case. As was the common
practice of the day, and because the local community demanded swift
justice, the Groveland Boys were indicted just four days after the
alleged event. They were arraigned three weeks later, and the trial was
set to begin in Tavares the following week. Not surprisingly, the
defense objected to the timeframe and the location of the trial. For its
time, the setting of the trial just over six weeks from the date of the
event would not have been unreasonable, or even unusual. But, the
Groveland case was anything but usual, and on the eve of the jury trial
the defense team filed a motion to continue the trial, and a motion for
removal of the cause (change of venue). Judge Truman Futch promptly
denied both motions, and the trial was set to commence in Lake
County on September 1, 1949—just 49 days after the event supposedly
occurred.
In analyzing the motion to continue, the defense relied on two
basic grounds in support of that motion. On a practical level, the
defense argued they had had inadequate time to investigate and
prepare a defense. To support this argument, the defense pointed to the
fact that NAACP attorney Frank Williams had only met with the
defendants, at Florida State Prison near Starke, on July 31, 1949.149
After his initial investigation, he and the NAACP began attempting to
find a (white) Florida attorney who would agree to represent the
accused. After failing to secure retentions of at least eleven Florida
lawyers,150 all of whom feared loss of income, reputation, or safety if
they took the case,151 Orlando attorney Alex Akerman, Jr. reluctantly
149
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151

Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing at 4, 12, Florida v. Shepherd, (D. Lake
Cty. Fla. 1949) (on file with author).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7; KING, supra note 6, at 137 (discussing Spessard Holland, Jr. tearfully
declining the NAACP’s plea to represent the Groveland defendants, stating,
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agreed to represent the Groveland Three.152 Akerman’s retention was
secured on August 22, 1949—just three days before the date of the
scheduled hearings on the pretrial motions.153 Ten days earlier, Judge
Futch had appointed a local member of the Lake County bar, a Harry
E. Gaylord of Eustis, to represent the three indigent defendants at their
arraignment. Gaylord pled the defendants not guilty, and agreed to an
August 29th trial date.154
For Judge Futch, the analysis to deny the defendants’ motion to
continue seemed reasonably simple. Using evidence adduced at the
pretrial motion hearing by the state of Florida, the applicable Florida
statutes, and local custom, Futch denied the motion. He was likely
correct in doing so. In support of his decision, Futch could take solace
in the following facts. The defendants’ appointed attorney at their
arraignment had agreed to the trial date.155 Officials from the Florida
State Prison confirmed that attorneys had met with the defendants on
three separate occasions, 156 and that they had taken with them a
stenographer, a dentist, and a doctor for the purposes of investigating
and documenting a defense.157 Additionally, State Attorney Hunter had
offered to use his resources to summon and serve any witnesses the
defense may want to call at trial.158 While Akerman’s retention was
certainly made late in the process, Judge Futch undoubtedly
understood that late retention or substitution of counsel is rarely, if
ever, a proper grounds for a continuance. The forty-five days from
indictment to trial was consistent with the standards of the day, and
was of no concern to either the Florida or United States Supreme
Courts.159 Lastly, the Florida statutes instructed the judges that trials
shall be conducted in the same court term in which a defendant, now in

152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

“[y]ou may not understand this, but my wife is a typical flower of southern
womanhood and this is a rape case and I can’t take it.”).
Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearings, supra note 149, at 7.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 14, 27.
Id. at 22.
See Shepherd v. Florida, 46 So. 2d 880, 885 (Fla. 1950). “Frequently the minds
of reasonable men differ on what constitutes sufficient time to prepare for trial.”
Id.
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state custody, was indicted.160 This statutorily authorized speedy trial
requirement existed equally for both the state and the defense. 161
Under the laws and customs of the day, Judge Futch’s denial of the
continuance on the grounds of inadequate time for preparation was
presumptively correct.
But the greatest motivation for the defense requesting a
continuance was not lack of time to prepare for trial, but rather the
desire to allow time for local passions to subside.162 This second prong
of their Motion to Continue created a much more difficult legal
decision for the trial court. Two major cases gave the defense
compelling arguments in seeking such a postponement. The first,
Powell v. Alabama,163 was of particular benefit to the defense because
it was the United States Supreme Court’s decision from the Scottsboro
Boys case — the case with which the Groveland Boys saga was being
compared. The second case, Moore v. Dempsey,164 was another United
States Supreme Court case that detailed the dangers of public passions
controlling legal proceedings. These two cases and the case at bar
shared many of the same sad facts: three communities demonstrating
great hostility, 165 atmospheres described as tense, hostile, and
excited,166 insurrection throughout the county,167 a military presence to
maintain order, a lynch mob ready to act if the courts did not, and a
local press publishing inflammatory articles. 168 Clearly, Moore v.
Dempsey was a warning to Lake County against falling into the trap
160
161

162
163

164

165
166
167
168

FLA. STAT. § 909.23 (1949).
Id. at § 916.01 (1949). But see, FLA. STAT. § 26.26 (1949), repealed by 2013
Fla. Laws ch. 2013-25 § 1. Florida’s fifth judicial circuit trial terms, per statute,
were the first Tuesdays of May and November, so Judge Futch could have
agreed to continue the matter as far as early November without running afoul of
Florida’s 1949 statutory speedy trial rights.
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53 (1951).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). The trial of the Scottsboro Boys
involved rape allegations by two white women against nine black youths. See
generally 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923). In Dempsey, five black men were
accused of killing a white man in Elaine, Arkansas during a period of
community violence, originally instigated by local whites. See id. at 87-88.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 51.
Id.
Moore, 261 U.S. at 88.
Id.
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demonstrated by Frank v. Mangum169—“If in fact a trial is dominated
by a mob so that there is actual interference with the course of justice,
there is a departure from due process of law[.]”170 The Moore court
was warning of cases where the “[j]udge and jury were swept to the
fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion.”171 The trial of the
Groveland Boys seemed to be on a fatefully similar path.
The Lake County court system, for its own practical reasons,
wanted the matter of the Groveland Boys handled as quickly as
possible. Those practical reasons were, quite simply, a desire to bring
the mass demonstrations and violence in Lake County to an end as
soon as possible.172 While this rationale may sound reasonable in light
of community safety, it speaks volumes in terms of the true
atmosphere of violence that surrounded the trial. Again, in spite of
Powell and Moore, Judge Futch denied the defendants’ motion to
continue. 173 While this legal decision was certainly questionable,
Judge Futch was on firm ground in distinguishing Powell and Moore
from the case at bar. In both Powell and Moore defense counsel was
appointed on the same day the jury trial was to commence.174 They
had, literally, no time to prepare or even meet with their clients before
jury selection began. This was the only concern the United States
Supreme Court had with the Powell verdict, and in fact said nothing
about the trial atmosphere or the time from event to trial. When Judge
Futch eyed his September 1, 1949 trial date, the fact that his
defendants had first met with investigative counsel on July 31,175 had
local counsel appointed on August 12, and had trial counsel retained
169

170
171
172

173
174
175

See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). In Mangum, a Jewish factory
superintendent, Leo Frank, was convicted of murdering a 13 year old female
employee on questionable evidence. Id. at 311. When his death sentence was
commuted to life in prison by the governor of Georgia, local citizens formed a
mob, kidnapped Frank from the state prison, and lynched him.
Moore, 261 U.S. at 90-91.
Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53
(1951). At a pretrial motion hearing Mabel Norris-Reese, editor of The Mount
Dora Topic, testified that State Attorney Hunter had confided in her that the
reason they wished to hold the trial as soon as possible was to put an end to the
violence and demonstrations in Lake County.
Florida v. Shepherd, (D. Fla. Lake Cty. Ct. 1949) (on file with author).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1932); Moore, 261 U.S. at 89.
Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 4.
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by August 22, he may have recognized that Powell and Moore were
not to be the controlling precedents. While Futch’s ultimate decision
or motives to deny the continuance may be criticized, his conclusion
appears solid.
Like Jerusalem Itself
Intimately intertwined with the defendants’ 1949 motion to
continue was their motion for removal of the cause (change of venue).
Understandably, the removal motion relied on essentially the same
facts and the same arguments of law as the motion to continue —
namely, that adverse pretrial publicity and a pervasive local climate of
prejudice and violence precluded the ability to obtain a fair trial in
Lake County. Certainly to the modern legal scholar, or anyone
applying a modicum of 21st century common sense, this motion
should have been granted. But not surprisingly, in 1949, Judge Futch
denied it. Ironically, three years later during the 1952 retrial of Walter
Irvin, Judge Futch did grant a motion to change the venue of Irvin’s
trial, but only removed the trial to the adjacent county of Marion.
Marion County was also in Florida’s fifth judicial circuit, had a similar
demographic makeup to that of Lake, and was also served by both
himself and State Attorney Hunter. To this end, Irvin’s 1952 change of
venue was hardly that, but Judge Futch’s decisions on both were likely
correct under the law of the day and the evidence presented. Both
decisions are analyzed below.
As to Judge Futch’s 1949 decision, Florida statute 911.02 provided
for a change of venue when a fair and impartial trial cannot be had,176
and it would seem that if any case in Florida’s legal history should
have warranted its application, it was the 1949 Groveland case. 177
Even Judge Futch’s own well-intentioned special rules of courtroom
decorum, put in place for the 1949 Lake County trial, seemed to
evidence the specter of violence surrounding the proceedings. 178
176
177

178

FLA. STAT. § 911.02 (1949).
See, e.g., CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 35. In response to the unprecedented
violence surrounding the Groveland case, the governor of Florida activated three
local national guard units from Leesburg, Eustis, and Tampa and dispatched
them to Lake County, where they remained until July 27, 1949.
See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 54. The trial judge, anxious to assure as
fair a trial as possible under the circumstances, was evidently concerned about
violence at the trial. Id. He promulgated special rules which limited the number
of visitors to those that could be seated, allowed no one to stand or loiter in
hallways, stairways, and parts of the courthouse for thirty minutes before court
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Change of venue (or removal) motions were a peculiar tool in the first
half of the 20th century. Their application was subject to wide
discretion within the trial courts, and those decisions would not be
disturbed on appeal absent a palpable abuse of discretion. 179 A
palpable abuse of discretion is arguably the toughest legal standard to
surmount on appeal. The standard essentially means that if there is any
modicum of reason to the trial judge’s decision, even a small one, that
decision will be upheld. In analyzing Judge Futch’s 1949 and 1952
removal rulings, we can find several such modicums of reason, even if
they may seem slight or antiquated from the modern perspective.
For starters, it is important to note that changes of venue cannot be
granted simply for purposes of forum shopping, selecting a friendlier
jurisdiction, or finding a county where a desired outcome is more
likely. This rationale would also apply to finding a county with better
race relations, or a more progressive outlook within their white
community. Secondly, assuming a fair trial can arguably be had in
such a location, the state has an equally compelling right to have the
case tried in the county where the crime occurred. This is the most
basic premise of common law jurisdiction. To that end, State Attorney
Jesse Hunter was probably correct when he argued in his answer to
application for removal of cause that any such negative pretrial
publicity regarding the Groveland case was so pervasive statewide that
it would be near impossible to find any other county in Florida—or in
the breadth of the South for that matter—that would have provided a
more impartial jury pool.180

179

180

convened and after it recessed, closed the elevators except to officers of the
court or individuals to whom the sheriff gave special permit, required each
person entering the courtroom to submit to search, prohibited any person from
taking a ‘valise, satchel, bag, basket, bottle, jar, jug, bucket, package, bundle, or
other such item’ to the courtroom floor of the courthouse, allowed crutches,
canes and walking sticks only after inspection by the sheriff showed them to be
necessary aids, prohibited demonstrations of any nature and made various other
regulations, all of which the sheriff was charged to enforce and to that end was
authorized to employ such number of deputies as might be necessary. Id. Such
precautions, however commendable, show the reaction that the atmosphere
which permeated the trial created in the mind of the trial judge. Id.
Shepherd v. Florida, 46 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 1950); Jeffcoat v. Florida, 138 So.
385, 387 (Fla. 1931).
Answer to Application for Removal of Cause, supra note 98, at 4; cf. Shepherd,
46 So. 2d at 883. The Florida Supreme Court likely grossly overstated Lake
County’s positive race relations when it wrote, “[o]ur study of the record reflects
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Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the fact that Judge
Futch’s removal rulings carried the necessary legal threshold of the
day can be found in two simple facts. First, in spite of the availability
of sixty peremptory juror challenges, or strikes,181 juries in both cases
were selected with very little difficulty and in a matter of a few hours.
Second, as governed by the high courts of the day, in four separate
appeals to the Florida and United States Supreme Courts, the issue of
venue was never addressed in a negative fashion despite being clearly
raised by the defense in both appeals. Silence by the appellate courts
regarding matters directly questioned on appeal did, and does, speak
loudly.
The 1952 retrial of defendant Walter Irvin forced Judge Futch to
make two more major legal rulings in relation to a defense motion to
remove. In anticipation of the 1952 retrial, which was removed to
Marion County for reasons discussed below, the NAACP hired a
professional polling firm 182 to gather race-relations data on four
Florida counties. 183 This data was to be used for purposes of
supporting their motion for removal. It should be noted that, as appears
to be the common practice of the day, the court stenographer did not
take down a verbatim account of the legal arguments surrounding this
issue. However, since this matter was briefed by both sides and
commented on throughout the appellate proceedings of the case, an
investigation can comfortably reconstruct those missing portions of the
transcripts.184

181

182
183

184

the view that harmony and good will and friendly relations continuously existed
between white and colored races in all other sections of Lake County.” Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 913.08(1) (1949). Each defendant in a criminal jury trial was
granted 10 peremptory challenges in a death penalty case, and the State received
an equal total number. In the 1949 trial there were three defendants, thus thirty
total defense strikes, plus a matching number for the State, equals sixty
peremptory strikes between the two sides. Additionally, challenges for cause
were unlimited in number.
Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 1953).
Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2 at 24, Irvin v. Florida, (D. Fla.
1952) (removed to Marion Cty.) (on file with author). The polling data was
collected for Florida’s Lake, Marion, Gadsden, and Jackson counties. Id.
It bears mentioning that throughout the various transcripts of the hearings and
trials surrounding the Groveland case there are numerous periods of pure legal
argument in which the court reporter notes he will not take down a verbatim
record of the account. This seems to be a product of the fact that court reporters
of the time viewed their transcription roles as being limited to the recording of
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Ultimately, Judge Futch refused to allow the polling data to be
entered into evidence, except for that limited data that related to
Marion County. 185 This was likely the correct decision, but Judge
Futch could have handled the matter in a more prudent manner.
Because this was a pretrial motion hearing which took place outside
the presence of the jury, the more advisable judicial maneuver would
have been for Judge Futch to simply allow all the defendant’s polling
data into evidence, and then only assign to it what weight he
considered necessary. Total exclusion of the defense evidence, in a
matter decided by the bench and that would never be seen by any jury,
seemed too harsh a remedy. Futch’s ultimate decision on the matter
was the classic tipsy coachman conundrum of arriving at the correct
conclusion through the application of incorrect rationale. 186 In
excluding the polling data, Judge Futch found the evidence to be
inadmissible hearsay (or perhaps improperly authenticated), because
the polling coordinator who was called by the defense to testify at the
January 1952 pretrial hearing merely compiled the data and did not
conduct the interviews himself. 187 Issues of hearsay and improper
authentication awkwardly batted around by the trial court, both parties,
and the Florida Supreme Court, 188 were all incorrect paths, which
ultimately led to the correct result. The polling data, if properly
presented, might have survived hearsay and authentication

185
186

187
188

witness testimony and evidence introduction (functions of the trial court), and
not the recordings of legal arguments (functions of the appellate courts).
Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 50.
James A. Herb & Jay L. Kauffman, Tales of the Tipsy Coachman: Being Right
for the Wrong Reason – The Tipsy Coachman is Alive and Well and Living in
Florida, 81 FLA. BAR J., 11 (Dec. 2007). The first legal reference to the tipsy
coachman appeared in the 1879 opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court in Lee v.
Porter, 63 Ga. 345 (1879), which states the rationale underlying the doctrine: ‘It
may be that we would draw very different inferences [than those drawn by the
trial judge], and these differences might go to uphold the judgment; for many
steps in the reasoning of the court below might be defective, and still its ultimate
conclusion be correct. Lee, 63 Ga. at 346. It not infrequently happens that a
judgment is affirmed upon a theory of the case which did not occur to the court
that rendered it, or which did occur and was expressly repudiated. Id. The
human mind is so constituted that in many instances it finds the truth when
wholly unable to find the way that leads to it. Id.
Brief of Appellee at 7, Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953).
See, e.g., id.; Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearings Part 2, supra note 183, at
36; Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 291-92 (Fla. 1953).
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objections. 189 The argument that best warranted their exclusion was
finally stumbled upon by the Florida Supreme Court when it
determined that this type of polling data was not a reliable method of
determining the likelihood of a fair trial. 190 In sum, the data was
excluded due to unreliability. This determination was firmly within the
province of the trial court, and Judge Futch’s ruling on such a matter
was only subject to review on an abuse of discretion standard.191 Given
the facts and limitations of this particular polling data, 192 Judge
Futch’s decision to exclude it was reasonable.
The second major removal issue facing Judge Futch during the
1952 retrial of Walter Irvin involved the change of the trial venue from
Tavares in Lake County, to Ocala in neighboring Marion. On
December 6, 1951 State Attorney Jesse Hunter agreed to Walter
Irvin’s request to remove the trial from Tavares, 193 which sits only
twenty-some miles from the alleged crime scene. In response to this
stipulation, Judge Futch ordered the removal of the trial venue to the
bordering county of Marion and its courthouse in Ocala. Sitting nearly
fifty miles to the north of Tavares and sixty miles north of Groveland,
189

190

191
192

193

See FLA. STAT. § 92.36 (1951) (indicating that Florida’s Business Records and
Evidence Act may have allowed for the admission of such data as a properly
compiled business record, but since this data was collected in anticipation of
litigation it may have fallen outside of this provision).
Irvin, 66 So. 2d at 291. “We cannot approve this method of determining the
likelihood of a defendant’s being unable to receive a fair trial in a given
community and therefore cannot attribute any abuse of discretion to the rejection
by the judge of the proposed testimony. As the appellant points out the
establishment of adverse sentiment of such degree as to indicate that the victim
of it cannot receive a fair trial is informal and largely based upon hearsay. But
the result of the poll taken in this case went far beyond the latitude allowed by
the statute and by established procedure.” Id.
Id.
See Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 36, 52. The
polling data compiler, while testifying at the hearing, admitted several questions
having nothing to do with the case; he could not articulate why Gadsden and
Jackson counties were selected for comparison; and he admitted comparing
Gadsden to Marion County was unfair due to recent political events in both
counties. One of the control questions was clearly misleading, and the pollster
admitted he could not draw a conclusion on the ultimate issue inquired of by the
poll.
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State
Att’y, and Suppression of Evidence at 25, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952)
(removed to Marion Cty.) (on file with author).
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Ocala offered a slightly larger city to host such a major event, but the
demographics and racial attitudes of the two locales were nearly
indistinguishable. Most importantly, and of the greatest concern to the
defense, was the fact that Marion County also sat within Florida’s fifth
judicial circuit, meaning Judge Futch and State Attorney Hunter would
still be handling the case.
Under the rationale outlined above, Judge Futch may well have
been justified in refusing to change the venue at all. Even so, the
decision to place it in Lake’s sister county of Marion may still seem
odd at first blush. However, once the order was made to change the
venue, the placement of the trial in Marion County was the correct
decision under the applicable law of the day. Florida statute 911.02(2)
provided that upon the granting of a change of venue motion, the
matter shall be removed to the appropriate criminal court “in some
adjoining county if there [is] one.”194 In 1952 the fifth judicial circuit
of Florida was comprised of five counties, 195 but only Marion and
Sumter adjoined Lake.196 Given the option of Marion or Sumter, one
might argue that Marion was certainly the lesser of those two evils.
Ironically, the selection of this much larger jurisdiction197 was likely a
tiny—albeit understandably unappreciated—victory for Walter Irvin
and his defense team.
In support of the selection of Marion County, and in an effort to
protect his record on appeal, State Attorney Hunter called numerous
civic and community leaders to testify to the positive race relations in
that county. 198 This evidence was largely uncontroverted by the

194
195

196

197

198

FLA. STAT. § 911.02(2) (1951) (emphasis added).
Id. at § 26.06 (1951). Lake, Marion, Sumter, Hernando, and Citrus counties
composed the fifth circuit.
Florida County Map, GEOLOGY, http://geology.com/county-map/florida.shtml
(depicting Lake County bordered entirely to the west by Sumter County, and to
the north and west by Marion County). Hernando and Citrus Counties do not
adjoin Lake County, as they sit to the west of Sumter County. See id.
Richard L. Forstal, Florida, Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900
to 1990, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, (Mar. 27, 1995),
https://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/cencounts/files/fl190090.t
xt (according to the 1950 U.S. census populations were: Marion County 38,187, Sumter - 11,330).
See, e.g., Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 105
(quoting a Marion County black preacher testifying that “[he] would put this
county up against Jerusalem itself”); Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 292 (1953)

228

UMass Law Review

v. 11 | 194

defense, 199 as they called no live witnesses to contradict the state’s
contentions. Additionally, Hunter successfully argued that no other
circuit in Florida would be so acutely aware of the proper selection of
jurors in compliance with the dictates of Cassell v. Texas as would the
Fifth Circuit, since a Cassell violation was the sole reason they were
retrying the matter at all. 200 In following the provisions of Chapter
911, the arguments of the state attorney, and the best evidence
available to him at the hearing, Judge Futch correctly removed Walter
Irvin’s 1952 trial to the adjoining county of Marion.
I’m Not Going to Tell You What He Told Me
Since the days of the English Common Law, criminal trial law has
never been a trial by ambush.201 One of the bedrock concepts of trial
procedure is the necessity of the prosecution to share information with
the accused. While these requirements of discovery and disclosure
have broadened over time, Judge Futch and State Attorney Hunter did
correctly comply with the (relatively limited) disclosure obligations of
the day.
When State Attorney Jesse Hunter learned from the Lake County
clerk that two attorneys, one from Tampa and the other from Miami,
might have been retained to represent the defendants in the case,
Hunter contacted them both and offered them any information that was
available to him. Furthermore, he contacted Florida State Prison on
their behalf and asked prison officials there to make the defendants
available for interviews with counsel. 202 At the August 12, 1949
arraignment, local appointed counsel Harry Gaylord motioned the
court for the appointment of a doctor and a dentist to evaluate the
defendants, and Futch granted those motions.203 X-rays taken of the

199

200
201
202
203

(citing the fact that Ocala had recently erected a World War II memorial to a
colored soldier as evidence of racial good will).
But see Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 113-14.
Irvin’s defense team did point out on cross examination of a state’s witness that
when the well-respected white sheriff of Marion County was shot and killed by
a black suspect just a few years before this date, the trial of the black suspect
was removed to Alachua County of the eighth judicial circuit of Florida because
the court felt he couldn’t get a fair trial in Marion. Id.
Answer to Application for Removal of Cause, supra note 98, at 5.
See generally Barrett v. Florida, 649 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1994).
Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 17.
Id. at 22.
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defendants at Florida State Prison were also provided to the defense.204
Lastly, State Attorney Hunter included a written version of his trial
witness list on the grand jury indictment,205 which was filed with the
clerk. In the 1949 trial of the Groveland Three, Florida’s statutory
discovery obligations had been properly complied with.206
By late 1951 however, on the eve of Walter Irvin’s retrial in
Marion County, the defense asked the Court to compel the production
of the substance of in-office interviews between the state attorney and
a key defense witness, a Mr. Lawrence Burtoft. 207 Judge Futch
correctly, under the controlling law of the time, denied the defense
motion. Lawrence Burtoft was the first person to come into contact
with Norma Lee Padgett after her alleged rape, and he had knowledge
of several facts that directly contradicted key aspects of her testimony.
Specifically, Mr. Burtoft would testify that although Norma Lee told
him she was abducted, she did not mention the fact that she was raped.
Additionally, and most importantly, she clearly indicated she could not
identify her assailants.208 Of course, within just a few hours of their
arrest or death she had positively identified all four. These pieces of
exculpatory information were not relayed by the state to the defense.
Clearly, following the United States Supreme Court’s landmark 1963
decision in Brady v. Maryland, such disclosure of exculpatory
information would now be required, and reversal would result should
such a disclosure fail to occur.209 Such was not the case in the years in
which the Groveland matter was pending. Four years before Judge
Futch’s correct denial of this 1951 defense Motion to Compel, the
204
205
206

207

208
209

Id. at 27.
Answer to Application for Removal of Cause, supra note 98, at 2.
See FLA. STAT. § 909.18 (1949) (detailing the discovery obligations of the State
Attorney’s Office in criminal prosecutions to include allowing the inspection,
copying, photographing, and examination of any ballistics, fingerprints, semen,
blood, stains, documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects,
or tangible things pertinent to the cause).
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State
Att’y, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 16-18. In over two pages
of hearing transcript, State Attorney Hunter tells defense attorney Akerman that
he will not divulge the substance of his interview with Mr. Burtoft six times. Id.
See Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 388.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91 (1963) (reiterating that “the suppression or
withholding, by the State, of material evidence exculpatory to the accused is a
violation of due process”).
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United States Supreme Court decided Hickman v. Taylor, which
established the basic premise that an attorney’s work product applied
to his written notes and his oral interviews with witnesses made in the
course of litigation preparation, and that they were privileged from
disclosure. 210 When Hickman is combined with the two major
exculpatory evidence disclosure cases of the time, which only required
the state to disclose knowingly false or perjurious testimony,211 we can
see that—at the time—Hunter was justified in withholding the
information, and Futch was correct in denying the motion to force its
production.
The Court Takes No Action
Upon entering the courthouse in Tavares for the 1949 Lake County
trial of the Groveland Three, the defense filed a motion to quash the
indictment based on Lake County’s improper grand jury selection
procedures—based specifically on the fact that potentially eligible
black jurors were knowingly and systematically excluded from
service. 212 Judge Futch properly refused to hear the motion, as he
correctly determined it to be untimely under the law.213
In 1949, Florida law did allow for a defendant to challenge an
indictment based on the grounds of unlawful selection procedures214 of
a grand jury panel. 215 As this was precisely the issue at hand, the
defense motion to quash was properly styled, factually accurate, and
legally correct. However, 1949 Florida procedure required a challenge
to an indictment returned by such an incorrectly impaneled grand jury
to be made at or before arraignment.216 Furthermore, if such challenge
210
211

212

213
214
215
216

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947).
See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (explaining that the
prosecution must disclose known perjured testimony); see also Pyle v. Kansas,
317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (declaring unconstitutional the use of perjured
testimony to obtain a conviction).
See Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 177, 179-81, 183.
Several county civil officials testified that Lake County’s grand jury selection
process involved the requirement that the prospective grand juror be a registered
voter. This greatly reduced the number of eligible black jurors, and was not a
requirement of Florida Statutes, Chapter 40. This additional requirement clearly
ran afoul of Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 8.
FLA. STAT. § 905.03 (1951).
Id. at § 905.02.
Id. at § 909.01.
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was not made as of that time, it was deemed waived.217 As of August
12, 1949, when the defendants were arraigned under the guidance of
locally appointed counsel, no such challenge was made. Therefore,
Judge Futch was correct in considering the motion, made on the eve of
trial and well after arraignment, to be untimely.
While Futch’s ruling on the procedural posture of the motion, as
presented to him, was correct, ultimately the United States Supreme
Court would agree with the defense that improper grand jury selection
procedures did warrant a reversal of the case.218 In fairness to Judge
Futch, however, it should be noted that Cassel v. Texas, the case which
served as the precedent for the reversal of the Groveland case, was not
decided until after the Groveland case had been tried, but before its
appeal.219 Thus, neither Judge Futch nor the defense had the Cassell
precedent available for consideration when contemplating this matter.
That Little Black Nigger Boy’s Clothes
A few hours after Norma Lee Padgett accused four young black
men of rape, Lake County Deputy Sheriff James Yates stood at the
crime scene with the recently arrested Walter Irvin. Deputy Yates had
just arrested Irvin at his home moments earlier, and he had taken Irvin
to the site of the alleged rape in the hopes of making a shoe print
comparison with tracks at the scene. When none of the prints seemed
to match, Yates asked Irvin if he had been wearing different shoes the
previous evening. Irvin indicated that in fact he had been, and that the
shoes he wore the night before were back at his family’s home in
Groveland, where he had just been arrested.220 This interaction would
be read with great legal concern by the modern criminal attorney, but
Yates’ inculpatory interview of Walter Irvin found its way into
evidence, before the jury, and without an objection. This was because,
in the years before the 1966 Miranda v. Arizona decision, 221 such
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Id. at § 909.06.
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950). The case was decided on April 24, 1950,
roughly seven months after the 1949 Groveland verdicts were entered.
Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 328.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating the prophylactic rule that a
government official now, upon initiation of custodial interrogation, must advise
the suspect of his 5th and 6th Amendment rights).
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custodial interrogation was not improper. 222 Armed with this
information, Deputy Yates returned to Walter Irvin’s home, where he
informed Irvin’s mother Deliah that he “came for that little black
nigger boy’s clothes.”223 Deliah Irvin, a woman with a second grade
education 224 and ignorant of her rights, 225 did as the armed 226
representative of the law227 instructed, providing Yates with her son’s
clothing and shoes from the previous evening. Deliah Irvin’s verbal
statements to Yates were objected to by the defense, but their objection
was correctly overruled, as such statements of consent would be
properly considered as non-hearsay verbal acts.228
The issue of the search and ultimate seizure of Walter Irvin’s
belongings, and most notably the shoes he wore during the time of the
alleged offense, was argued before the trial court over a two day
period during the 1949 trial, and then again during a pretrial motion
hearing before the 1952 retrial. Much to the concern of Irvin’s defense
team, none of those legal arguments were transcribed. 229 Ultimately
however, the issue was briefed for appellate purposes and the Florida
Supreme Court inexplicably ruled there was no Constitutional 4th
222

223
224
225
226
227
228

229

See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897) (indicating that a selfincriminating 5th Amendment statement’s admissibility was purely a question of
voluntariness); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)
(explaining that suspects have the free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer
police questioning); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (declaring that the
privilege against self-incrimination is fulfilled only when the person was
guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak).
Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 144.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 145.
Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 565.
See Porter v. Ferguson, 4 Fla. 102, 105 (1851) (instructing that “[t]he
declarations of a party, made at the time of a transaction, and expressive of its
character, motive, or object, are regarded as verbal acts, indicating a present
purpose and intention, and, therefore, admitted in proof, like any other material
facts”).
After the retrial of Walter Irvin, Akerman wrote to the NAACP’s Jack
Greenberg, “I am somewhat concerned over Paul [Perkins’] report that the Court
Reporter would not honor his order for a copy of Hunter’s argument. I am afraid
that the record may appear as different from what actually happened but we will
see when the record is furnished.” Letter, from Alex Akerman, Jr. to Jack
Greenberg, (April 13, 1952) (on file with author).
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Amendment violation since there were no elements of search or
seizure.230 How the Florida Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion
that there was no seizure when inculpatory evidence was removed
from the private bedroom closet of a criminal suspect defies all legal
logic, but this conclusion was not questioned by the United States
Supreme Court.231 For purposes of this analysis, no weight is placed
on the findings of these high courts.
At the 1949 trial, Judge Futch denied the motion to suppress, and
the Florida Supreme Court affirmed his ruling on the misplaced belief
that Deputy Yates had asked politely for the clothing, and that Deliah
Irvin freely provided access to the same.232 In reconstructing the likely
arguments of these un-transcribed hearings based on the available
legal scholarship and the records on appeal, we know the defense
based their arguments around the theories of acquiescence to
authority 233 and third party consent.234 Specifically, they argued that
Deliah Irvin could not have provided knowing and voluntary consent
to the search of her home, and specifically to that of Walter Irvin’s
private bedroom. To support those theories, the defense posited that
Mrs. Irvin’s consent to search her son’s bedroom was only given
because of the overt show of police authority exerted upon her by
Deputy Yates. Furthermore, even if she did freely consent she was not
entitled to grant such consent on her adult son’s behalf over his private
sleeping quarters. As a corollary argument, the defense also
complained of the fact that Deputy Yates failed to obtain a warrant,
although obtaining one would have been quite simple. The reliance on
230
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Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 293 (1953).
Irvin v. Florida, 346 U.S. 927 (1954) (certiorari denied).
Irvin, 66 So. 2d at 293. “The mother testified that when the officer appeared, he
did not threaten her or attempt to coerce her. Id. When asked if ‘he [the deputy]
just politely asked you for the clothes and shoes’, she replied, ‘yes, sir, he did,
and I got them for him because he was the law.’” Id.
See generally Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (explaining that a
consent to a search or seizure will be deemed invalid if the government official
makes such a show of his authority so as to negate the free and voluntary choice
to refuse said search or seizure).
See generally Fuller v. Florida, 31 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1947) (explaining that a third
party may consent to a search or seizure on behalf of a suspect is a factual matter
determined on a case-by-case basis and relates primarily to the level of
independent control said third party exerts over the place to be searched or the
thing to be seized).
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this argument, however, was clearly as misplaced then as it would be
now.235
Without any articulation of rationale, as was his custom, Judge
Futch denied Walter Irvin’s Motion to Suppress. We now turn our
attention to the accuracy of that ruling. Again, it is the tipsy coachman
doctrine that comes to Judge Futch’s aid. While Futch presumably
denied the motion based on a misguided finding of consent, the denial
of the motion was likely legally correct under a different theory in
1949—that of search incident to arrest. The seminal case in this area of
the law at the time of the Groveland trials was that of Agnello v.
United States. Under Agnello, police practitioners of the time would
have understood “[t]he right without a search warrant . . . to search the
place where the arrest was made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime . . . is not to be doubted.”236 This doctrine
was reaffirmed and even extended in the case of Harris v. United
States, decided by the United States Supreme Court just two years
before the Groveland case. In Harris the Court wrote, “[s]earch and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest is a practice of ancient origin and has
long been an integral part of the law enforcement procedures of the
United States and of the individual states.” 237 Furthermore, “[i]t is
equally clear that a search incident to arrest, which is otherwise
reasonable, is not automatically rendered invalid by the fact that a
dwelling place . . . is subjected to [the] search,”238 and such a search
“can extend beyond the room in which the [subject] was arrested.”239
Based on the language above, the Harris case is squared with the case
at bar. Knowing he had no involvement in wrongdoing, Walter Irvin
welcomed Deputy Yates into his home upon Yates’ initial arrival at
around daybreak of July 17, 1949. Once inside, Yates arrested Irvin,
then drove Irvin out to the crime scene somewhere near the LakeSumter county border, and then drove Irvin back to his Groveland
home upon learning the shoes he was looking for were still in Irvin’s
235
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This case was decided while the Groveland case was pending, but the defense
was already arguing the wrong test. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 66 (1950) (declaring the relevant test is not whether it was reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable).
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947).
Id. at 151.
The defendant in Harris, just like Walter Irvin, was arrested in his living room,
but the evidence was found in his bedroom. Id. at 152.
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closet. Upon returning to the Irvin house, Yates encountered Deliah
Irvin, effectuated his search, and seized the correct shoes. While this
search of Irvin’s home occurred after some temporal break, it could
certainly be argued that since the search incident to the arrest would
have been proper just moments before, it would still be a valid search.
Assuming this rationale to be correct, Judge Futch’s denial of the
motion to suppress was proper.
The defense sought to readdress the matter as the 1952 retrial of
Walter Irvin drew near. Judge Futch added a degree of difficulty for
the defense in this regard when Walter Irvin himself was not made
available to testify at the 1952 suppression hearing, because Judge
Futch did not have him transported from Florida State Prison for that
hearing. While Futch may very well have understood that Irvin’s
absence would deprive his defense team of the value of his testimony
and insight into the facts supporting the renewing of their motion, his
failure to have Irvin transported to the hearing was in accordance with
Florida law, which did not require the presence of defendants at
pretrial motion hearings.240
The second hurdle facing the defense in their renewed 1952 motion
to suppress was the doctrine of the law of the case. When both the
Florida and United States Supreme Courts chose to not address Judge
Futch’s 1949 ruling on the suppression motion, at the 1952 retrial
Futch correctly kept the same ruling intact under this doctrine.241 The
concept of the law of the case stands for the proposition that, when an
appellate court passes upon a question and remands the cause for
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the
case, and it remains as the ruling in effect throughout the pendency of
the matter.242 It is also worth noting that this application of the law of
the case doctrine would have been correct even if a different trial judge
had been presiding over the 1952 retrial, because even a successor
240
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FLA. STAT. § 914.01 (1951) (codifying that pretrial motion hearings are not one
of the enumerated circumstances requiring a defendant’s presence).
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 24.
See Ball v. Yates, 29 So. 2d 729, 738 (1946) (clarifying the general rule that
“[t]he ‘law of the case’ has to do with questions of ‘law’ decided on appeal as
applied to subsequent proceedings of the case. . . The decisions agree that as a
general rule, when an appellate court passes upon a question and remands the
cause for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the ‘law of the
case’ upon a subsequent appeal . . .”).
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judge would have been bound by Judge Futch’s original 1949 ruling
once it was passed upon by the appellate courts.
Unfortunately for Walter Irvin and his Groveland co-defendants,
who were undoubtedly damaged by association with Irvin’s
inculpatory evidence, it was not until the United States Supreme Court
decided the 1969 case of Chimel v. California that the police actions
such as those of Deputy Yates’ on July 17, 1949 were curtailed.243
Through the right conclusion but under the wrong rationale, Judge
Futch’s allowing Walter Irvin’s infamous shoes into evidence paved
the way for another of the many terrible injustices that compounded
themselves into the full tragedy that was the Groveland
prosecutions.244
A Fair and Clean Prosecutor
Before the 1952 retrial of Walter Irvin, the defense filed a motion
to disqualify J.W. Hunter as State Attorney. In it, they claimed that
Hunter had not conducted the prosecution of the case in a fair and
impartial manner. 245 Specifically, the defense alleged Hunter gave
news interviews with false information, that Hunter refused to turn
over exculpatory evidence, and that he improperly intervened into the
United States Department of Justice’s investigation into the shooting
death of defendant Samuel Shepherd by Lake County Sheriff Willis
McCall.246 These matters and others were taken up at a December 6,
1951 pretrial hearing in Tavares. The hearing was a complete and total
victory for the prosecution, and a detailed examination of the legal
analysis applied justified this result.
243
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Chimel began the process of severely limiting the search incident to arrest
exemption by greatly curtailing the timeframes, areas, and propriety of such
searches. See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
See KING, supra note 6, at 356. Expert witnesses later concluded that Deputy
Yates’ plaster cast shoe print evidence in the Groveland case was forged. No
human foot was in the shoes from which Yates made the casts. This fraudulent
evidence was crucial in linking the Groveland defendants to the crime scene.
Even worse, in 1962, Yates was federally indicted by the FBI for criminally
falsifying plaster cast evidence in another investigation, but the case against him
was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Yates was immediately
reinstated as deputy by Sheriff McCall, and awarded back-pay for his missed
time.
Motion to Disqualify State Attorney at 2, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952)
(removed to Marion Cty.) (on file with author).
Id. at 2-3.
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The pretrial hearing ended as a victory for the state because the
defense failed to prove any of their allegations. 247 At the hearing,
through defense direct examinations, it became clear that it was likely
Sheriff Willis McCall—not State Attorney Hunter—who had provided
the press with false information.248 Then, as was analyzed earlier in
this work, Judge Futch correctly ruled that Hunter’s refusal to disclose
the exculpatory evidence provided to him during his investigatory
interview with witness Lawrence Burtoft was proper. 249 Lastly, no
evidence or testimony was presented to support the defense contention
that Hunter was improperly involved in the Department of Justice’s
investigation of Samuel Shepherd’s death at the hands of Sheriff
McCall.
The evidence that the defense did attempt to admit—
predominantly local and national news articles—Judge Futch unwisely
excluded. While he may have been correct in viewing the defense
subpoenas for such information as unduly over-broad,250 Futch would
have been wiser to simply admit the evidence and then assign it little
weight. Just as he did with the bulk of the defendant’s polling data
evidence, Judge Futch overreached in excluding defense evidence
from these two non-jury hearings. However, unlike the polling data
evidence, there is reason to believe that Futch may have had genuine
concerns that if he admitted too many anti-Hunter documents one of
them may have contained a true bombshell. His poor decision to keep
all of this evidence out of the public record may have been motivated
less by true legal acuity than by a desire to protect the good name of a
good friend. Either way, this was poor judicial practice.
In response to the defense motion to disqualify him, Hunter filed
affidavits from eleven leading local civic and legal personalities251 in
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See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of
State Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 4-24.
This false information was largely disseminated via press reports, likely
provided by Sheriff McCall, that the Groveland defendants had confessed to the
crime while in custody, when in fact, there were no such confessions, or the socalled confessions were obtained through unlawful police brutality. Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 17-18. Prior to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), this interview
constituted attorney work product and was therefore exempt from disclosure.
Futch properly criticizes the defense for utilizing blunderbuss subpoenas that are
vague and over broad. Id. at 7.
Id. at 22-23.
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support of his position as a fair and clean prosecutor. 252 Although
common sense might tell us that Judge Futch needed little convincing
as to the professional reputation of his lifelong friend and colleague,
the weight of these affidavits was, no doubt, compelling to the neutral
observer. 253 The affidavits described Hunter as a practitioner of
eminent fairness and impartiality,254 and relayed a series of cases and
anecdotes detailing Hunter’s history of fair dealing in race-related
prosecutions.255 When the defense objected on grounds that affidavits
were an improper form of evidence in such a hearing,256 Judge Futch
correctly overruled the objection.257
From an evidentiary analysis alone, Futch’s decision and desire to
deny the motion to disqualify Hunter would have been relatively easy.
All the evidence presented at the hearing was marshaled in favor of
Hunter, and in 1949 there was no legal precedent for the
disqualification of a state attorney,258 but the state had an additional
252
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255

256

257

258

Affidavit of Clyde H. Lockhart, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed to
Marion Cty.) (on file with author).
Affidavits of support came from, among others, the former sheriff of Citrus
County, the State Attorney for the Eighth Judicial Circuit, the former State
Attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, and the President of the Fifth Judicial
Circuit’s Bar Association. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of
Venue, Disqualification of State Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra
note 193, at 22-23.
Affidavit of Pat Whitaker, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed to Marion
Cty.) (on file with author).
See, e.g., Affidavit of Charles S. Dean, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed
to Marion Cty.) (on file with author) (relaying the story of the prosecution of a
black man who killed a white man in which Hunter, unconvinced of the
defendant’s guilt, asked the judge to enter a judgment of acquittal); Affidavit of
Tim M. Sellar, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed to Marion Cty.) (on file
with author) (writing about a case in which Hunter successfully prosecuted the
unpopular case of three white men who killed a black man).
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 22.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.19 (1951). As to the form of evidence utilized at a hearing:
if the moving party uses affidavits, then the responding party may also use
affidavits. Here, it did appear the moving party - the defense - used affidavits
from defendants Irvin and Shepherd in support of their Motion to Disqualify
State Attorney Hunter. Once the defense utilized affidavits, the State would be
able to reply in kind.
See Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 914 (Fla. 2001) (explaining that the
current standard for disqualification of a prosecutor is a showing of substantial
misconduct or actual prejudice); see also Kearse v. Florida, 770 So. 2d 1119,
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argument that would ultimately carry the day. The state successfully
raised the argument that only the Governor of Florida could disqualify
a state attorney, and therefore the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to
do so. Futch eagerly agreed with this premise and promptly denied the
motion to disqualify the State Attorney. The defense did not argue this
point at all, and in fact, they seemed to concede the matter.259
Again, Futch’s decision to deny the motion was likely correct as
the (now modern) legal standard for disqualification had not been met
by the defense, but he opted to rely on the lack of jurisdiction
argument instead. He could have been correct under either theory.
Case law, statutes, and attorney general opinions from before the
Groveland trials made clear that a trial judge could replace a state
attorney upon a vacancy of the position, but no authority seemed to
authorize a trial judge’s ability to remove a sitting state attorney from a
case.260 Thus, while a Florida judge in 1952 may have had the legal
authority to disqualify a state attorney upon proper evidence, the
absolute availability of such a judicial action was not clear until
1971.261 For either or both of these reasons, the motion to disqualify
State Attorney Hunter was properly denied.
Attorneys in Good Standing
During the same December 6, 1951 pretrial hearing in which the
motion to disqualify the State Attorney was properly denied, Judge
Futch incorrectly barred two of the NAACP’s out-of-state attorneys
from being able to practice pro hac vice during the hearing. When
court convened at 10:00 A.M. in the Tavares courthouse, Alex
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1129 (Fla. 2000) (defining actual prejudice as a specific legal injury as opposed
to a mere racial or societal prejudice, requiring the proponent to show something
more than the mere appearance of impropriety).
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 23-24.
See, e.g., Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 10 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1942)
(asserting that, upon the disqualification or absence of a state attorney from
office, the governor has the authority to substitute or replace said state attorney);
FLA. STAT. § 32.72 (1951) (explaining that a judge has the authority to appoint a
new prosecutor in any matter whenever there is a vacancy, a non-appointment,
or otherwise). The statute does not appear to authorize the judiciary to disqualify
or remove a state attorney.
See generally Thompson v. Florida, 246 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1971) (lending a
reasonable inference that a trial court does have the authority to disqualify a
state attorney from a specific prosecution).
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Akerman, Jr. began his second defense of the Groveland case by
asking Judge Futch to allow two NAACP lawyers, Thurgood Marshall
and Jack Greenberg, to be especially admitted to practice law in
Florida as special counsel in this cause.262 This temporary pro hac vice
admittance was a relatively common practice for members of the bars
of other states whose practice in Florida would be limited to a singular
or special appearance. Both Marshall and Greenberg, who practiced
law primarily as appellate attorneys in front of the United States
Supreme Court, were both members of the Maryland state bar. 263
Under Florida statute 454.03, their admission to practice in Lake
County for the limited purpose of the defense of the Groveland case,
should have been immediately granted. 264 However, State Attorney
Hunter objected to their pro hac vice admission on the grounds that
“they both represent the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, and [have] been responsible for the vicious,
slanderous and libelous matter filed in this Court and circulated against
this Court. . .”265 Despite Florida statute 454.03 seeming to offer no
judicial discretion for Judge Futch to disallow special admittance to
Marshall and Greenberg, he did so anyway, and his ruling appears
wholly incorrect.266 In a silent twist however, Futch’s error seemed to
have been quickly remedied. By the January 9, 1952 motion hearing
262
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Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 1-2.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 454.03 (1951) (codifying that “[a]ttorneys in good standing of
other states may appear in particular cases in the courts of this state, when under
the rules of comity of such states, attorneys from Florida are similarly permitted
to appear; but attorneys of other states shall not do a local or general practice in
this state . . .”).
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 2.
Cf. CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 105. Ironically, the 1952 trial was not the first
time Judge Futch encountered the question of pro hac vice practice during the
course of the Groveland prosecutions. On the eve of the original 1949 trial, State
Attorney Hunter asked the court to allow the appointment of his son Walter as a
special assistant state attorney for purposes of assisting him during the trial.
Futch granted the motion for the appointment. Seizing that opportunity, the
defense immediately moved to allow NAACP attorney Franklin Williams, a
member of the New York bar, to practice pro hac vice and assist the defense.
Having just granted Hunter’s motion, Futch likely felt compelled to grant the
defense’s as well, and he did.

2016

The Law of the Groves

241

date both Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg had been admitted
after a subsequent written motion by the defense, and both participated
fully in that and all subsequent court events related to the Groveland
case.
A Jury of Their Peers
While the 1949 Groveland convictions were overturned on appeal
based on Cassell v. Texas violations involving improper grand jury
selection procedures, the voir dire and selection of the two petit juries,
both presided over by Judge Futch, seemed devoid of error. In spite of
State Attorney Jesse Hunter’s habitually improper leading questions
throughout the voir dire process, the defense never raised an
objection.267 Judge Futch correctly excused jurors for cause when they
indicated they did not fully appreciate the defendants’ Constitutional
presumption of innocence, 268 when they indicated they had already
formed an opinion on the case, 269 when they were related to the
prosecutor,270 and when they indicated they were acquaintances with
the family of the alleged victim. 271 In spite of the difficult task of
selecting a jury in a county in which every single potential juror
indicated they had already heard of the case, 272 the 1952 trial only
required fifty-three potential jurors to be questioned before both sides
had agreed on a trial jury.273 Of the fifty-three potential jurors in the
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273

See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 256, Florida v. Shepherd, (D. Lake Cty. Fla. 1949)
(on file with author).
Judge Futch sustained a defense challenge for cause after a juror stated, “[W]ell,
I don’t know as I could consider them innocent,” and sustained another after a
prospective juror indicated it would require some evidence from the defense to
remove his current opinion. See id. at 257, 407.
See id. at 408 (noting an example of a challenge for cause granted when a
prospective juror was unsure if he could set aside his preconceived opinions of
the case); id. at 425, 430 (noting additional examples of prospective jurors who
were properly excused for cause after indicating unwavering opinions based on
newspaper articles).
Id. at 440.
Id. at 368.
Brief of Appellant at 51, Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953).
Brief of Appellee, supra note 187, at 4.
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1952 voir dire, only five were African-American. 274 None were
selected to serve.275
A Fresh Complaint
With juries selected, the evidentiary phases of the Groveland trials
commenced. Upon the proper request, Judge Futch correctly read and
invoked the rule of sequestration, which required all potential
witnesses to remain outside the courtroom during the testimony of all
other witnesses. 276 The most common and most basic testimonial
evidentiary rulings placed before Judge Futch came in the form of
objections to hearsay. To his credit, Judge Futch’s understanding and
application of the rules of hearsay seemed solid.277 Throughout both
trials, Futch ruled on several matters touching upon various
applications of the hearsay rules, and while many were rather trivial,
his rulings on those objections, whether entered by the state or the
defense, were largely correct.
The first of several major rulings during the evidence phase of the
trial came in the form of a hearsay objection, and it came during the
testimony of Willie Haven Padgett. During Willie Padgett’s direct
examination he was asked by the state attorney what statements his
wife had made to him upon his first contact with her after the alleged
rape. The defense properly objected to this line of questioning as
hearsay, and the state countered that such evidence should be admitted
274
275

276

277

CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 311.
See generally Jury Trial Voir Dire Transcript at 1-266, Irvin v. Florida, 66 So.
2d 288 (Fla. 1953) (removed to Marion County). Of the five potential black
jurors summonsed, two were struck peremptorily by the State, two were excused
for cause based on pre-fixed opinions, and one was excused for cause based on
his moral opposition to the death penalty. Id.
See id. at 266-67 (explaining that the rule of sequestration, commonly called
“The Rule” by practitioners, is a common law principle of witness exclusion
which requires all trial witnesses to remain outside the courtroom during the
evidentiary phase of a trial so that no one witness will have the benefit of
hearing the testimony of another); see also Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at
459.
See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 598. Ethel Thomas, the mother of
deceased defendant Ernest Thomas, was asked to relay what her deceased son
had told her when she told him to go home. The deceased party’s response,
“[n]o,” was objected to as hearsay and properly overruled as non-hearsay under
the common law res gestae exemption from Bowen v. Keen, 17 So. 2d 711 (Fla.
1944).
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under the fresh complaint exception to the hearsay rule.278 While the
fresh complaint exception is now essentially extinct due to adverse
statutory and case law authority, 279 in 1949 the exception was well
established and constituted competent evidence. This was especially
well known in Florida’s fifth judicial circuit, as the seminal case on the
matter stemmed from a Marion County case decided by the Florida
Supreme Court just one year before. In the case of Custer v. Florida,
the Florida high court ruled that evidence of a complaint of rape soon
after the occurrence is admissible to rebut the inference of consent, but
it is only the fact of the complaint itself, not the details of the rape,
which is admissible.280
Custer made clear that the fact that Norma Lee alleged a rape
would be admissible, but her first human contact was with Lawrence
Burtoft, not her husband. The defense contended this fact negated the
applicability of the fresh complaint exception. Judge Futch disagreed,
and allowed Willie Padgett to testify to his wife’s rape allegation.281
Under the law of the time, Judge Futch was correct in doing so. The
fresh complaint exception, as enunciated in Custer, did not necessarily
require the complaint be made to the first person with whom a rape
victim came into contact; the language of the case simply required the
report be made soon after the occurrence.282 The contemporary legal
treatise series American Jurisprudence acknowledged that delayed
complaints were acceptable when supported by the circumstances, or
when the victim was only in the presence of strangers. 283 In the
Groveland opinion, the Florida Supreme Court explained that, “[f]rom
the very nature of such an experience we think [Norma Lee Padgett’s]
reply to her husband . . . without telling the first man she saw, a virtual
if not a total stranger, was entirely natural and that the admission of the
278
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Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 472.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.101 – 958 (1976). When Florida codified its rules of
evidence in 1976, it recognized roughly thirty exceptions to the hearsay rule, but
chose not to codify the fresh complaint exception; see also Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (abrogating many of the statutory and common
law exceptions to the hearsay rule in favor of a renewed emphasis on the right of
confrontation of live witness testimony).
Custer v. Florida, 34 So. 2d 100, 112 (Fla. 1947) (citing Ellis v. Florida, 6 So.
768 (Fla. 1889)).
Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 277.
Custer, 159 Fla. at 112.
65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 63 (2015).
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testimony did not violate that spirit of the [fresh complaint] rule.”284
Sadly, this seems to be one of the few legal matters the Florida
Supreme Court ruled on correctly in regard to its two Groveland
opinions. Nonetheless, the opinion supports Judge Futch’s conclusion
as well.
Those Shoes Made Those Tracks
Having shown a clear and accurate grasp of Florida’s common law
hearsay rules, the next series of rulings encountered by Judge Futch
came in the form of objections to three major items of physical
evidence and the testimony surrounding them. Just as was the case
with the various hearsay objections, Futch’s legal conclusions as to the
physical evidentiary objections proved correct as well. It was in these
two areas of the law that Judge Futch seemed to be the most accurate
from the point of view of legal retrospection.
The first item to be analyzed was “State’s Exhibit #1”, a dirty, lint
covered handkerchief found at the location of the alleged rape, which
was purported to belong to Norma Lee Padgett. Introduced during the
direct examination of Lake County Deputy Sheriff James Yates, the
soiled handkerchief was abandoned in a bushy thicket near the scene,
and was located and recovered by Yates. The prosecution argued it
was covered in similar lint to that found in the defendants’ vehicle.285
The defense objected to its introduction as irrelevant and improperly
authenticated. To this, Judge Futch responded tersely, “[l]et it be
received.” 286 Overruling the objection on relevance grounds was
simple, as the handkerchief, for all the reasons argued by the
prosecution above, clearly satisfied the simple threshold for
relevance. 287 However, while Futch’s ruling on the relevance of the
handkerchief was simple and correct, the portion of the defense’s

284
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Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 294 (1952).
Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 537-539.
Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1976) (codifying the ancient common law doctrine of
relevant evidence that considers evidence relevant if it “tend[s] to prove or
disprove a material fact”). Clearly, the soiled handkerchief of the alleged victim,
left at the scene of the offense, and covered in a substance consistent with that of
the interior of the offenders’ vehicle, satisfies this provision.
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objection to improper predicate or authentication requires greater
analysis.288
While the chain of custody aspect of authentication was
unquestionably satisfied by the fact that Deputy Yates had collected
the handkerchief at the scene, brought it into the courtroom, and
identified it in open court, Deputy Yates would have had no
knowledge of the fact that the handkerchief belonged to the alleged
victim unless he was so informed by Norma Lee Padgett. Under this
rationale, such testimony may have called for hearsay, or may have
supported the defense objection to relevance. However, a hearsay
analysis would have shown, that under 1949 common law, any such
statement to Deputy Yates by Norma Lee indicating her possessory
interest in the handkerchief would have been non-hearsay. Such a
statement was non-hearsay because it was not to be offered for its
truth, but rather to explain the actions of the listener, or rather why
Deputy Yates collected that particular item of evidence.289 Lastly, even
if Judge Futch had found the predicate to be lacking, and Deputy
Yates’ testimony regarding the alleged victim’s interest in the
handkerchief to be hearsay, the state could have simply recalled
Norma Lee Padgett to the stand to lay the final piece of the predicate
herself. Therefore, under any such analysis, the introduction of the
handkerchief was proper.
Following the proper admission of Norma Lee’s handkerchief, and
still during the direct examination of Deputy Sheriff Yates, the state
sought the introduction of the most contested, the most damning, and
the most reprehensible item of physical evidence introduced during the
course of the Groveland prosecutions. The centerpiece of Deputy
Yates’ investigation into the Padgetts’ allegations was his taking, or
creation, of plaster casts of tire marks290 and shoe prints291 from the
scene of the alleged rape. From the moment these casts were first
offered into evidence, controversy and tragedy closely followed.
288
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Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 539 (objecting on grounds of relevance and
failure to lay an adequate foundation) .
See FLA. STAT. § 90.801 (1976) (defining hearsay as a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted).
See Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 540-551 (dealing with the introduction
of the plaster tire casts).
Id. at 556-58.
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The defense objection to the tire and shoe casts came via multiple
theories of exclusion. First, the defense objected that Deputy Yates
lacked the necessary expertise to take or create such casts, and they
even interrupted the state’s direct examination to voir dire Yates
themselves to highlight his lack of formal forensic training.292 In spite
of excellent legal work on the subject by the defense, Futch correctly
dismissed their argument on this ground. Specifically, he was justified
in finding that, even though Yates’ training on the subject was limited
to having studied it from some books,293 the taking of the plaster casts
“by pouring plaster paris into the tracks, letting it harden, and then
lifting it out of the ground”294 was not a forensic skill that required
education in an advanced scientific technique or specialized expertise.
Given the rather elementary nature of the cast-making procedure, and
its simple lay applications, this conclusion was likely correct.
Secondly, as it related to the tire casts taken from the dirt road
shoulder of the alleged rape location, the defense raised the argument
of relevance. Specifically, they argued that the tracks “could have been
made by hundreds of cars in Lake County with like treads or tires, and
that the casts didn’t tend to prove anything at all, let alone a material
fact.” 295 While this rationale is undoubtedly true, such an argument
clearly goes to the weight of such evidence, and not to the
admissibility. Judge Futch seems to have correctly understood this
legal distinction, and was correctly unmoved by this avenue of the
defendants’ objection.
The last line of defense posited on the matter of the plaster casts
was also the most successful, and it is in this area probable error on the
part of Judge Futch exists. This theory of exclusion was centered on a
line of Florida case law that limited the testimony of non-expert
witnesses in evidentiary matters of comparison. By his own admission,
Deputy Yates was not a scientific expert. 296 Indeed, under Florida’s
statutory requirements for expert witnesses in 1949, he could not
legally be considered as such since he lacked a professional degree
from a university or college, and he did not possess special
292
293
294
295
296

Id. at 541-47.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 540.
Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 335, 365 (confirming that Yates is not a
scientific expert).
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professional training and expertise in the applicable field.297 The state
of Florida conceded this point. Given Yates’ lay witness status, his
testimony would therefore be limited by three major Florida cases.298
Namely, this line of cases stood for the proposition that a lay witness
could describe the visible properties of comparison evidence, and
could testify to their similar characteristics, but could not opine or
conclude that both items of comparison were identical, the same, or
from the same person.299 These conclusions, the court reasoned, fell
within the province of the jury. Both sides seem to have acknowledged
these proscriptions in their subsequent legal briefs,300 but Judge Futch
did not correctly curtail Yates’ trial testimony so as to keep it within
these parameters. To this end, Futch incorrectly allowed Yates to
testify to the ultimate and impermissible conclusion that Walter Irvin’s
shoes specifically made these distinct tracks.301 The defense properly
objected at the time of the testimony, and properly raised the matter on
appeal.
Judge Futch’s failed application of the Ferguson-Johnson-Alford
case law was clearly improper, and was undoubtedly prejudicial to the
defense. This assignment of error is true in spite of the fact that the
Florida Supreme Court validated Judge Futch’s incorrect ruling by
extending the Ferguson-Johnson-Alford rule to accommodate for
Futch’s error in the record of this case.302 Being saved by a subsequent
and questionable extension of the law by a higher court does not
change our analysis and miraculously render the trial court’s prior
297
298

299

300

301
302

FLA. STAT. § 90.23 (1949).
Ferguson v. Florida, 28 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1946); Johnson v. Florida, 46 So. 154
(Fla. 1908); Alford v. Florida, 36 So. 436 (Fla. 1904).
See generally Ferguson, 28 So. 2d at 427; Johnson, 46 So. at 154; Alford, 36 So.
at 436.
In both the State and Defense Appellate Briefs to the Florida Supreme Court
following the 1952 trial of Walter Irvin, both sides agreed on the current status
of the law as controlled by Ferguson, Johnson, and Alford. See Brief of
Appellant, supra note 272, at 104; see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 187, at
10.
See Brief for Appellant, supra note 272, at 104.
Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 296 (1953) (reasoning that “[w]e do not think it
would be logical to hold that in the circumstances a witness could say that in his
comparison of shoes and tires with the tracks, he found at the scene, the imprints
bore precisely the same characteristic marks as the objects, but that reversible
error would result from his stating the conclusion based on these observations
that the objects made these imprints”).
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ruling correct. In this situation, both in 1949 and 1952, Judge Futch
was bound by the rule as laid out in Ferguson-Johnson-Alford, and his
failure to constrain Yates’ testimony to it constituted a harmful error at
the time. Here, two wrongs still do not make a right. In conclusion, the
admission into evidence of the tire and shoe casts, as well as the
testimony regarding their similar characteristics, both over defense
objections, was correct. However, Futch’s allowance of Yates’
ultimate opinion attributing the shoe prints to Walter Irvin himself was
a grave trial error under the controlling law of the day. Of course, the
confirmation of the fact in later years that Yates had forged the shoe
prints, a fact of which we hope Judge Futch was unaware in 1949,
casts yet another tragic shadow over the whole of the Groveland story.
Tell the Truth for Once in Your Life
Having seen Judge Truman Futch to be relatively solid in his
application of the hearsay rules, and accurate in all but one ruling in
the area of physical evidence, we now turn our attention to Judge
Futch’s hit and miss analysis regarding impeachment and character
evidence. In these rulings, Futch was inconsistent and often incorrect.
From the standpoint of legal scholarship, this seems to be the area in
which his rulings were weakest.
Judge Futch began his back and forth encounters with character
evidence objections in the form of the defense impeachment of state
witness Henry Singer. Mr. Singer, a member of Groveland’s AfricanAmerican community, testified to defendant Charles Greenlee’s
involvement in the illicit neighborhood gambling practice of bolita,
also known as Cuba. The defense sought to cross examine Mr. Singer
on his own involvement in these illegal games, but Singer had never
been convicted in court for such an act, so Judge Futch properly
sustained the state’s objection as it constituted improper character
evidence.303 Immediately thereafter, the defense correctly impeached
Singer with a prior court conviction for the offense of impersonating
an officer.304

303
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Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 593-94; FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1949)
(instructing that impeachment by evidence of prior criminal activity must only
be in the form of a court conviction).
While Florida Statute section 90.610 (2015) does not permit the introduction of
prior misdemeanor offenses for impeachment purposes, the 1949 version of the
statute made no such distinction. See FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1949).
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Faced with essentially the same scenario but with the parties
reversed, Judge Futch stumbled through the testimony of witness
Lawrence Burtoft during Walter Irvin’s 1952 Marion County retrial.
Burtoft had not testified in the original 1949 Lake County trial, but his
knowledge of inconsistencies in Norma Lee Padgett’s testimony made
him a crucial defense witness during the retrial. Having undertaken
great lengths to secure his attendance at the 1952 retrial, in spite of his
being stationed with the United States Marine Corp in North Carolina,
his testimony was essential to the 1952 defense of Walter Irvin. It was
the substance of Burtoft’s testimony that Hunter had refused to
disclose in 1949, and it was Burtoft’s testimony that now formed a key
pillar in Irvin’s defense strategy. 305 On cross examination, State
Attorney Hunter sought to impeach Burtoft with the fact that the Lake
County Sheriff’s Office and the Burtoft family were engaged in a bit
of friction over the Burtoft family’s ownership of a local dance hall
where alcohol was sold.306 The defense objected, and Hunter argued
that such evidence was relevant to show the witness’ bias against local
law enforcement.307 Understanding that since the days of the English
common law evidence of bias has long been allowed,308 Judge Futch
correctly overruled the defendant’s objection. Just minutes later,
Hunter was growing increasingly frustrated with Burtoft’s testimony,
so when Burtoft responded to an inquiry by saying he had helped
Norma Lee, Hunter fired back, “[d]on’t you think you would be
helping her more if you told the truth for once in your life?” The
defense immediately objected and moved to strike what was clearly an
impermissible and argumentative question, but Judge Futch overruled
their objection. 309 While such a trite comment was likely of small

305

306
307
308

309

Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 388. Specifically, Mr. Burtoft testified that
although Norma Lee told him she was abducted, she did not mention the fact
that she was raped. Additionally, and most importantly, she clearly indicated to
Mr. Burtoft that she could not identify her assailants.
Id. at 389.
Id.
See Pandula v. Fonseca, 199 So. 358, 360 (Fla. 1940) (explaining “[i]t is error to
exclude questions touching interest, motives, animus, or the statute of a witness
in a suit.”); see also Tervin v. Florida, 20 So. 551, 554 (Fla. 1896) (stating “[t]he
fact sought to be elicited tended to show the bias of the witness towards the
defendant, which it was competent for the State to show”).
Trial Transcript, supra note 305, at 396-397.
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consequence amidst such a trial, this was certainly an objection that
Judge Futch should have sustained.
The last matter of impeachment evidence to examine, which was
presented to Judge Futch during the cross examination of Deputy
Sheriff James Yates, was also the trial’s most crucial. Due to Yates’
presence at, and alleged involvement in, the State Road 19 shooting
which claimed the life of Samuel Shepherd and seriously injured
Walter Irvin, Alex Akerman took a brave stab at the deputy while he
on the stand. Is it true, Akerman asked Yates, “that the Defendant
Walter Irvin has accused you and the Sheriff of Lake County, Florida
of attempting to murder him?” The state objected, the defense argued
the question was relevant to show the witness’ bias, and Judge Futch
sustained the state’s objection. As discussed above, Florida cases such
as Pandula v. Fonseca and Tervin v. Florida had long held that
questions that probe at witness bias are admissible, 310 but such
inquiries should not digress into collateral matters which may be
uncalled for by the circumstances.311
On appeal the Florida Supreme Court agreed with Judge Futch’s
exclusion of this far-flung question by reasoning that if such
questioning was permitted, any defendant “could make an accusation,
however idle, against a prospective adverse witness, then use his own
charge, even if wholly unfounded, to his advantage.” 312 While the
Florida Supreme Court was suspiciously cavalier with this hugely
important matter, further characterizing its legal credibility in the
Groveland matter as questionable, the point of disallowing bias
impeachment with wholly unfounded allegations does hold some
merit. Looking at this inquiry in a light most favorable to Judge Futch,
the attempted murder allegations levied by Irvin against Yates and
McCall were, from a purely calloused legal standpoint, still technically
unfounded. Indeed, at that point the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a
federal grand jury, the state attorney’s office, and a coroner’s inquest
had all failed to return affirmative findings of culpability as to Yates or
McCall in the matter of the shooting of Irvin and Shepherd. While
these findings were likely influenced greatly by local prejudice, the
cold fact remained that, at the time, Futch was dealing with an
unfounded allegation. Regardless of technicalities or legal minutia
310
311
312

Pandula, 199 So. at 360; Tervin, 20 So. at 554.
Tully v. Florida, 68 So. 934, 937 (Fla. 1915).
Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 295 (1953) (emphasis added).
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however, the defense inquiry of Deputy Yates into the attempted
murder of the trial defendant was likely substantiated enough to have
allowed its admission, and its exclusion probably contributed to a very
real miscarriage of justice. Futch’s exclusion of this evidence was
likely driven more by local allegiances and personal feelings than by
any whisper of the law. Therefore, it may be argued that it was Judge
Futch’s own bias that improperly precluded the evidence of Deputy
Yates.
Allow the Jury to be Carried to the Scene
Just before Walter Irvin’s 1952 defense team announced rest, Alex
Akerman made a rather unusual request of the court. Due to
uncertainties in the testimonies of the state’s witnesses regarding the
actual location of the alleged rape, the defense hoped to raise doubt in
the jurors’ minds concerning the proper county of venue for the
offense. Testimony from Deputy Sheriff James Yates placed the
offense occurring so close to the Lake-Sumter county line that a
Sumter County road sign was used as a visual point of reference in
Yates’ investigation. For his part, however, Yates was clear that his
investigation revealed the offense did in fact occur in Lake County.
Hoping to seize on a possible discrepancy however, Walter Irvin’s
defense team asked Judge Futch to allow the jury to be carried to the
scene of the alleged crime.313 Specifically, they were making a motion
for a jury view. Without hesitation, and without any announced
analysis, Judge Futch correctly denied the motion.
“When, in the opinion of the court,” according to Florida Statute
918.05, “it is proper that the jury should view the place where the
offense appears to have been committed . . . it may order the jury . . .
to be conducted in a body to such place.”314 Statutory language that
included words like opinion and may would seem to indicate that great
latitude was granted to the trial judge in making a determination for a
jury view, and the case law interpreting this statute confirms this
perspective. 315 Thus, Futch’s decision on the matter would not be
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Trial Transcript, supra note 305, at 440.
FLA. STAT. § 918.05 (1951).
See, e.g., Panama City v. Eytchison, 184 So. 490, 492 (Fla. 1938) (declaring that
“[t]he time, circumstances, and conditions under which a view by the jury will
be permitted are at all times in the discretion of the trial court”).
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disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion,316 and the only conclusive
geographical evidence presented at the trial supported the fact that the
offense occurred in Lake County.
Indeed, even Yates’ sketchy road-sign testimony would have been
enough to justify Futch’s denial of the motion, but there were also
several provisions of law that would have supported his conclusion as
well. First, unlike proof of the elements of the crime or the
identification of the defendant, venue did not have to be proven to the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Rather, in 1952, the legal
standard of proof for venue was the much more modest standard of
reasonable inference. 317 Secondly, even if the location of the actual
rape was unclear, it was undisputed that the initial abduction site was
in Lake County. Under the common law doctrine of res gestae, which
would view an abduction and subsequent rape as part of a common
sequence of events, it could be argued that venue was proper in the
county where the offense began. This position was supported by
Florida’s venue statutes of the day, which provided that where several
acts are requisite to the commission of an offense, venue is proper in
any county in which any of such acts occurred.318 Under any or all of
these various theories, Judge Futch’s decision to deny the defendant’s
motion for jury view was either correct, or well within his discretion.
Bring the Defendant Back to the Stand
By the time court was adjourned for the evening on February 13,
1952, the defense had called three witnesses of their own, including
Walter Irvin himself, and they had rested their case. The next morning,
Walter Irvin’s retrial reconvened for its final day. When court was
called to order at 9:30 A.M., Assistant State Attorney A.P. Buie
shocked the court and the defense when he announced, “the State
requests the right to bring the Defendant Walter Irvin back to the stand
for further cross examination.” The defense quickly objected. Perhaps
316
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See Tully, 68 So. 934 (explaining the standard on review for motions for jury
view is a clear abuse of discretion).
Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 446.
See FLA. STAT. § 910.05 (1951); see also FLA. STAT. § 932.04 (1951). When an
offense is committed in one state but acts leading to its commission occurred
within another state, venue is proper in either state. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 910.04
(1951). When a defendant receives aid in one county to effectuate an offense,
but consummates the offense in another county, venue is proper in either county.
Id.
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sensing the storm he had walked into, Buie quickly backtracked on his
request by stating, “[w]e do not insist on it; we just have one question
to ask him, but it’s within this Court’s discretion.” 319 In response,
Akerman asked Judge Futch to excuse the jury, and after they had left
the courtroom, the defense asked for a mistrial. 320 Judge Futch
sustained the objection, but denied the motion for mistrial.321
Judge Futch was undoubtedly correct in sustaining the defendant’s
objection to being called as a witness by the prosecution in his own
trial. Both the United States Constitution and the Florida Statutes
clearly forbade such an act, as both specifically protect against
compelling a citizen to be a witness against himself. 322 Indeed, the
right to silence is one of the greatest fundamental concepts of the
American legal system. Under both statutory and case law authority
the prosecution was entirely out of bounds in undertaking this request,
and to do so in the presence of the jury made the matter even more
shameful. 323 Judge Futch, using more words than at seemingly any
other point in the trials, declared, “the objection is good I think and is
sustained.”324 No doubt, the objection was good.
The harder legal analysis comes in the form of examining Judge
Futch’s denial for a mistrial based on this improper act by the
prosecution, in the presence of the jury. Assistant State Attorney
Buie’s timid retraction did not make the situation any less harmful, as
the jury had already heard both statements, and as the southern lawyers
of the day might have said, “that bell can’t be un-rung.” The issue
319
320
321
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Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 446.
Id.
Id. at 445-46.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring “[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself”); FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1951)
(stating no accused person shall be compelled to give testimony against
himself).
See FLA. STAT. 918.09 (1951) (instructing nor shall any prosecuting attorney be
permitted before the jury or court to comment on the failure of the accused to
testify on his own behalf) (emphasis added); Rowe v. Florida, 98 So. 613, 618
(Fla. 1924) (holding that “calling the attention of the jury, by the prosecuting
officer of the State, to the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf, it
matters not how adroitly he may attempt to evade the command of the statute, or
how innocently it may be done, comes within the exception and deprives the
defendant of the protection the statute was intended to secure, and of his
constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial”).
Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 446.
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presented to Judge Futch, while clearly harmful, was also unique. The
case of Rowe v. Florida and its early 20th century progeny all dealt
with cases where, factually, the defendant never took the stand on his
own behalf. 325 This case, in which a defendant who had taken the
stand and the State sought to re-call him, seemed to be a matter of first
impression. If these facts were consistent with Rowe, Judge Futch
would have been required to grant the mistrial, as the Florida high
court had determined that no trial court remedy would cure such an
impermissible comment. In Rowe, however, the defendant never
testified at all.
The fact that Walter Irvin had testified on his own behalf, and then
the state improperly sought his return to the witness stand, perhaps
takes the Groveland case out of the control of Rowe, and places it on
its own. Without question, this situation was factually unique, and to
seek a mistrial in 1952 meant asking the judge to step very far out onto
a very slim branch. Florida’s pre-1952 case law greatly cautioned trial
judges against granting mistrials, and the case law clearly supported a
presumption against them. In this area, wide judicial discretion was
afforded, and mistrials were only to be granted for matters of
manifest326 or absolute327 necessity. “The granting of a mistrial,” wrote
the Florida Supreme Court in Perry v. Florida, “should be only for a
specified fundamental or prejudicial error . . . of such a nature as will
vitiate the result.” 328 The error here would certainly have been
fundamental, as per Rowe, but perhaps for the fact that the defendant
had already testified. If the error was something less than fundamental,
and something more akin to merely improper, the Perry court advised,
“the proper procedure is for the defendant to request the court to
instruct the jury to disregard such objectionable remarks, and not that a
mistrial be entered by the court. . .”329 Certainly under today’s more
cautious approach to improper prosecutorial comments on a
defendant’s right to remain silent, such an error would be deemed
325
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Rowe, 98 So. at 618 (noting that where the defendant did not testify at trial and
the prosecution commented on that failure, reversal was the only remedy).
Florida ex rel. Wilson v. Lewis, 55 So. 2d 118, 119 (Fla. 1951).
Florida ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, 23 So. 2d 484, 484 (Fla. 1945) (explaining
that the power to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury should be done with
great care and caution).
Perry v. Florida, 200 So. 525, 527 (Fla. 1941).
Id.

2016

The Law of the Groves

255

fundamental and a mistrial would readily be granted. Whether this
should have risen to a mistrial in 1952, however, is a tight call. For
guidance we might note that neither the United States nor Florida
Supreme Courts addressed the matter on appeal, but while their silence
is persuasive, it is not definitive. Given the careful protections afforded
a defendant’s right to be free from adverse comments on his silence—
protections firmly enunciated by 1952— the author concludes that
Judge Futch should have granted a mistrial under these circumstances.
In the interests of practicality, however, we might safely and sadly
conclude that the awarding of a third trial would simply have resulted
in the same tragic outcome.
The State Calls Sheriff Willis V. McCall
The most controversial, most beloved, and most hated man in the
entire Groveland saga had not been called as a witness at any point in
the two trials concerning the greatest criminal investigation to ever
take place in his jurisdiction. But on the afternoon of February 14,
1952, just before the prosecution intended to announce rest in its
rebuttal case, they made another surprising announcement. The state of
Florida called Willis V. McCall to the stand.330 Presumably, the state
intended to utilize McCall as a rebuttal character witness to offset the
testimony of defense witness Lawrence Burtoft—namely, to testify to
Burtoft’s reputation for dishonesty within the community, and his
family’s contentious dealings with Lake County law enforcement due
to their operation of an alcohol-serving dance hall. If Hunter intended
to utilize McCall’s testimony for any other purposes, we shall never
know. Two questions after he was sworn in to testify, the defense
objected to McCall’s ability to serve as a witness. Their argument was
based on the fact that, due to his position as sheriff, McCall had been
present in the courtroom working as a bailiff throughout the whole of
the proceedings, and therefore his testimony would be in violation of
the rule of sequestration that Judge Futch had properly imposed at the
outset of the trial.331 State Attorney Hunter argued that “the Rule,” by
330
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Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 452.
Id. at 452-453 (arguing against the calling of Sheriff McCall and the defense
objection to same); Id. at 266-267 (explaining the rule of sequestration,
commonly called “The Rule,” was a common law principle of witness exclusion
which requires all trial witnesses to remain outside the courtroom during the
evidentiary phase of a trial so that no one witness will have the benefit of
hearing the testimony of another).
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local custom, did not apply to law enforcement officers, but Judge
Futch correctly sustained the defendant’s objection, and Sheriff
McCall stepped down from the stand and returned quietly to his
post.332
Why Sheriff McCall was never called earlier in the trial
proceedings, or asked to remain outside the courtroom so as to
preserve his eligibility to testify, will perhaps forever remain a wellkept secret of trial strategy for both sides. Likely, both parties viewed
him as a potential time bomb that might explode unwittingly in the
hands of the questioner. His testimony would certainly have carried
great weight for the prosecution, but the risk of exposing him to
defense cross examination, especially on the matter of the shooting of
defendants Shepherd and Irvin, likely made him a dangerous
commodity on the stand. Likewise, the defense may forever regret
objecting to his testimony and wish they had seized the opportunity to
cross-examine the most contentious figure in this twisted drama; or,
they may be relieved that the powerful figure was left guarding the
back door. In either case, it is reasonable to assume that both sides
equally feared what McCall may have said, and as a result, elected to
leave the slumbering giant at rest.
Couched in Different Language
After both sides had rested their cases, but before beginning
closing arguments, Judge Futch finalized the compilation of the jury
instructions which would be read and provided to the jury. The
purpose of jury instructions is to advise the trial jury of the applicable
laws relevant to their deliberations. The Florida Supreme Court did not
adopt a uniformed set of standard, or pattern, jury instructions until
1981. During the days of the Groveland trials, the task of compiling
the jury instructions landed on the trial judge to perform on a case-bycase basis. In addition to the inclusion of the necessary and basic
instructions on the elements of the offense, the burdens of proof, the
presumption of innocence, the definition of reasonable doubt and
several others, the defense sought the inclusion of three special jury
instructions. These special requested instructions covered the legal
topics of the defense of alibi, the situation of a notorious case, and the
special scrutiny of the testimony of a rape victim. 333 These three
332
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special instructions were hand-scrawled on a long piece of legal paper
and presented to Judge Futch for his consideration.
The only one of the three special defense instructions Judge Futch
agreed to give was the special requested instruction on the defense of
alibi. 334 The instruction on the alibi defense was proper, and was
supported by the facts adduced at trial. Judge Futch was correct to give
it. The remaining two requested instructions were refused, and these
decisions were also correct. Judge Futch did not give the requested
instructions on notorious case335 or rigid scrutiny for the testimony of a
rape accusatrix 336 since the basic set of instructions that was given
adequately addressed the same concerns of law.337 When the standard
instruction sufficiently covers a legal matter, it is proper to refuse a
special instruction on that same issue.338 As such, Judge Futch’s denial
334

335

336

337
338

Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 527. “Defendant’s Requested Instruction #2 –
Given – The defendant, under his plea of not guilty, sets up as a defense what is
known in law as alibi, which means that the defendant was not there when the
crime charged was committed, and consequently did not do it. Id. If from the
evidence in this case you have a reasonable doubt as to the alibi—that is to say,
whether the defendant was there or not—then you should give him the benefit of
such reasonable doubt, and find him not guilty.” Id.
Handwritten Document on Legal-Size paper attached to the Record on Appeal,
supra note 333. “Gentlemen of the Jury, this has been and is a very notorious
case, and there has been more or less excitement over it, and that feeling may
possibly have crept into the trial to some extent. I am not saying that it has, but
for fear that it has and in abundance of caution, that nothing but justice may be
done, I deem it my duty to instruct you and caution you, against convicting the
defendant though prejudice or upon insufficient evidence and to caution you that
in your deliberations you should not be influenced one whit by what is
commonly called public sentiment. In other words you must consider the
evidence that has been given you on the witness stand and that alone in arriving
at your verdict.”
Cf. Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 521. “You, gentlemen, are the judges of
the credibility of the witnesses who have testified in the case, and of the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence. To determine what weight you give the
testimony of a witness . . . you are to consider the manner and demeanor of the
witness upon the stand, the bias, prejudice or interest of the witness, if any
appear, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the testimony, the probability
or improbability of it being true, and the intelligence of the witness.” But cf. id.
“In a case of this kind where no other person was an immediate witness to the
alleged act the testimony of the prosecutrix should be rigidly scrutinized.”
See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 520.
Blackwell v. Florida, 86 So. 224, 226 (1920) (stating that “it is not error to
refuse to give instructions that have already been given substantially, though
couched in different language”).
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of their inclusion was correct. In fact, it might be noted that after the
trial concluded and while awaiting appeal, Alex Akerman was already
aware of the propriety of the rulings. In an April 1952 letter to defense
co-council Jack Greenberg, Akerman wrote: “I enclose copies of the
requested Instructions [which were refused] with citation noted on
each Instruction. From a study of the cited cases you will see that our
position is not too strong.”339
By a Technicality He Stopped Me
The last major objection of the trial, and one in which the defense
also sought the declaration of a mistrial, came during the prosecution’s
closing arguments. In substance this event was linked to the defense’s
objection to Sheriff McCall’s ability to be called as a state witness due
to the rule of sequestration, and Judge Futch’s correctly sustaining that
objection. During his summation, State Attorney Hunter asked defense
witness Lawrence Burtoft if he had it in for the Law Enforcement
agencies of Florida and Lake County, and claimed, that due to a
technicality, the defense prevented him from proving the affirmative
nature of the response to this question. 340 Hunter was, of course,
referring to the fact that he attempted to call Sheriff McCall as a
witness to rebut Burtoft’s testimony, but was denied the ability to do
so because of the invocation of the rule of sequestration. The defense
immediately objected to this argument, asked that the jury be excused,
and then sought the remedy of a mistrial. When Judge Futch denied
the motion for mistrial, Akerman asked that the court instruct the jury
to disregard the statement as made by the States Attorney. As to both
requests, Judge Futch simply replied, “[t]he motion is denied.”341
Just as was the case with the state’s improper attempt to re-call
Walter Irvin to the witness stand, Judge Futch erred again in his failure
to deliver a curative instruction to the jury regarding this comment as
well.342 Even the Florida Supreme Court, who had essentially rubberstamped every issue in the two trials thus far, saw fit to call this act
irregular, and agreed the “remark should not have been made, and

339

340
341
342

Letter from Alex Akerman, Jr. to Jack Greenberg, Re: Groveland Case (April
13, 1952) (on file with author).
Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 508.
Id.
Perry v. Florida, 200 So. 525, 527 (Fla. 1941).
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having been, the court should have instructed the jury to disregard
it.”343
As to the issue of granting a mistrial however, the Florida Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court. They found no need for a mistrial,
and found any such errors that were committed to be harmless.344 Just
as was the case in the request for a mistrial based on the State’s
improper attempt to re-call Walter Irvin to the witness stand, the
accuracy of Judge Futch’s decision to deny the motion for a mistrial
here was a true coin-flip on the spectrum of correctness. There is little
doubt that appellate courts were much more forgiving of improper
arguments of counsel during the early 20th century than they are
today. From the case of Dunlop v. United States we can gauge the
temperature of the United States Supreme Court in the years before the
Groveland case when they wrote:
There is no doubt that, in the heat of argument, counsel
do occasionally make remarks that are not justified by
the testimony, and which are, or may be, prejudicial to
the accused . . . If every remark made by counsel
outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal,
comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the
ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even
the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried
away by this temptation.345
While this rather forgiving tone would not be found in a recent
court opinion, perhaps the closest precedent to the case at bar came in
the form of Berger v. United States. 346 In the Berger case the
prosecutor also criticized the technicalities of the rules of trial
procedure, and in a similar effort to insinuate to the jury why he failed
to prove a certain matter, he explained that he was bound by “the rules
of the game, and that he had to play within those rules.” Because the
Supreme Court found the case against Mr. Berger was weak and that
the pronounced and persistent comments by the prosecution were
improper, Berger’s conviction was overturned on appeal.347
343
344
345
346
347

Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 295 (1953).
See id.
Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897).
See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
Id. at 88-89.
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Using Berger as the polestar, we may say that an improper
comment by the prosecutor regarding technicalities or impediments
within the rules of trial procedure should result in a mistrial if the
overall evidence in the case was weak and/or the prosecutor’s
improper comments were numerous. While the modern criminal
attorney would certainly find both of these prongs met within the
Groveland trials, we cannot simply impose a modern-day analysis onto
the courtrooms of 1952. Modern or ancient biases aside however, the
best argument to support a finding of correctness here is in the fact that
all aspects of the complained of technicality did occur in the presence
of the jury. While error occurring in front of the jury is usually a
profound negative, here it may have been a positive. Because the jury
had heard the Rule of Sequestration invoked, and they heard the
defense object to it being violated by placing a man on the stand who
the jurors saw standing in the courtroom with them for three straight
days, we may conclude that Hunter’s reference to this technicality was
nothing that the average juror would not have been able to surmise for
themselves. If this is true, then Futch’s denial of the motion for
mistrial was correct under the rather stringent presumptions against the
granting of mistrials that were in effect at the time. If not, then Futch’s
denial was the second very serious error during the trials of this case.
With Any Innocent Man’s Blood on My Soul
As the second Groveland trial came to an end in Marion County,
four attorneys, one of which would go on to be a United States
Supreme Court justice, made closing arguments to the all-male, allwhite Ocala jury. All four attorneys made references and arguments of
fact and law that would truly appall the modern trial lawyer. For more
than 120 pages of court transcripts one can read a series of arguments
replete with more improper comments than one could find in a modern
law school textbook on that very subject. The only comment objected
to by either side, however, was Hunter’s technicality comment.
Because these comments went without objection at trial, Judge Futch
was not asked to make rulings on their propriety. They went
subsequently unaddressed through two appeals. Therefore, it would be
fruitless to undertake an analysis of these comments in this Article
since neither the parties nor the court saw it fit to concern themselves
with these issues at the time. To that end, the comments made by both
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sides in the Groveland court saga are mere footnotes, both in trial
history, and in this Article.348
348

Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 457 (violating the Golden Rule by asking the
jury what they would have done in they were in that circumstance); id. at 509
(violating the Golden Rule by starting a question in the following manner: “Now
gentlemen, would you have told him, or would your wife have told him . . .”);
id. at 471 (inserting personal information about himself, Buie stated, “I have
been in the Army myself . . . I was engaged in that kind of work in the Army,
and I participated in many Court Martials . . .”); id. at 481 (replying to Buie’s
improper insertion of personal information about himself by doing the same,
Marshall proclaimed, “I too know about them, I have been in many many court
martial proceedings . . . all the way from here to Korea and back”); id. at 499500 (speaking extensively about his personal experiences, Attorney Ackerman
said, “I want to give you a little bit of my experience in regard to my personal
conduct in undertaking the defense of this case . . . I did not want to defend this
case, I don’t want to do it now . . . I am now in the Navy of the United States . . .
I knew what the criticism against me would be . . .”); id. at 501 (improperly
inserting his personal beliefs, Ackerman professed that when he told Irvin to tell
nothing but the truth, that he believed that Walter Irvin has done just that; “I
believe that he has told you the truth from this stand”); id. at 505 (speaking of
his career experience, Hunter explained, “I have never prosecuted a man in my
career who I believed to be innocent. . .” ); id. at 518 (improperly sharing
irrelevant personal experiences and beliefs, State Attorney Hunter states,
“[g]entlemen, I have been seriously ill . . . I have been stricken with a fatal
disease . . . I may soon have to meet the Almighty, and I don’t want to meet the
Almighty with any innocent man’s blood on my soul, and Gentlemen, I don’t
believe that I will ever do so. . .”); id. at 472 (improperly speaking on the safety
of the community, Buie opined, “[g]entlemen, until we get back to the place
where our grandfathers started out with the law . . . I don’t know what will
happen to this county”); id. at 517 (lecturing improperly, Hunter explained that,
“in a case of this kind, every sacred tradition of your life and my life, and of our
civilization is at stake”); id. (explaining improperly his personal beliefs about
the safety of Lake County, Hunter stated, “I want to leave this county and this
State in such a condition that no bunch of men can come in and snatch up your
wife or your daughter and carry her out in the woods and rape her”); id. at 474
(attacking a witness at the trial, Buie exclaimed, “the statement that [the witness]
made is the most asinine statement that I have ever heard before in a Court of
the State of Florida, and yet he sits up here and expects you to believe any such
junk as that”); id. at 510 (insulting another at the trial, Hunter shouted, “the
other one was a damn liar”); id. at 516 (offending the fundamental concept of
equality and personally attacking a race of people, Hunter asked, “Isn’t that just
the colored way of thinking?”); id. at 475 (imposing his personal beliefs that law
enforcement has no interest in the outcome of the case, Buie asked the jury,
“[n]ow, are all these [officers] liars; have they any interest at all in the outcome
of this case, have they any reason to lie on this stand, and swear to a lie?”). Buie
immediately supplements the question with his personal belief, “[n]o,
gentlemen, I don’t believe they would.” Id.; see id. at 475 (introducing prior
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PART III: CONCLUSIONS
The Whittler
For anyone who has ever stepped into a small-town southern
courthouse, it is not hard for imaginations to still see Judge Truman
“the Whittler” Futch on the bench. Clothed in a black robe, he is
sitting in a large chair, leaning back in it as far as the laws of gravity
will allow. He is turned at such an angle so that the whole of his body
is turned away from the courtroom, and his eyes and hands are fixed
on his incessant task of whittling down old scraps of wooden fences.
His legal rulings are generally confined to four words or less.
But, we do not need our imaginations to see his results. Those are
well preserved in orders, transcripts, and opinions. Those are matters
of public record. From those we have learned that Judge Futch, despite
the historiography, seemed to be largely correct in his legal rulings
through the whole of these two trials. For whatever his reasons or
rationales, none of which did he espouse upon verbally, he was
overwhelmingly correct in his rulings on pretrial motions, objections
to hearsay, and applications of physical evidence. These examples are
matters of the cold application of facts to law, and they were
impartially governed by the fairly conservative case law of his day.
However, Judge Futch was weak on matters of character evidence and
impeachment, and he bordered on the overtly erroneous when trial
matters delved into improper comments made by the prosecution.
Here, there could be no cold application of the law. These issues
touched on matters of friendship, community, personality, bias,
prejudice, and conscience. In these areas, where a judge needs to be at
his strongest, Judge Futch showed his weakness. Like the scraps of
wooden shavings scattered under his bench would attest to, Judge
Futch was sharp and focused when the wood was hard and the
substance firm, but as the pieces narrowed into individual splinters and
the blade inched too close to human skin, he cast the piece to the floor
and began the process anew.
evidence of bad character, which is now universally irrelevant unless the defense
opens the door, Buie informed the jury that, “this boy here has received a
general court martial and a dishonorable discharge from the Army of the United
States, and there is trouble in this boy’s heart . . . and [trouble] has stayed in his
heart . . . after he got back home to Groveland”).
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Victory or Tragedy?
After two trials and two sets of appeals, the NAACP had spent
nearly $50,000 on the defense of the Groveland case, 349 nearly ten
times the amount spent by Lake County to prosecute it. The NAACP
had little to show for their efforts. Two defendants were dead, one had
been sentenced to death twice, and one was currently serving his life
sentence. Groveland was short on results, but long on impact. Few
trials can match the chaos, fear, violence, bigotry, and drama of the
Groveland case. In all of American legal history, only three or four
racially motivated trials can even claim peer status with the Groveland
trial. In this respect, Groveland takes its place next to such infamous
racial prosecutions as Leo Frank, 350 Sacco and Vanzetti, 351 and
Scottsboro.352 Yet, while Groveland is every bit the historical equal of
these legal giants, it is by far the least well known.
What then are the morals of this great but forgotten case? Should
Groveland be viewed as a victory or a failure of the United States legal
system? Overwhelmingly, the current historiography paints Groveland

349
350

351

352

CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 347.
See THE LEO FRANK CASE RESEARCH LIBRARY, www.leofrank.org (last visited
Apr. 13, 2016). The Leo Frank Trial involved the 1915 Georgia prosecution of a
Jewish businessman in Atlanta for the murder of a thirteen year-old girl at the
factory he ran. After his conviction on thin evidence, Frank was sentenced to
death. However, his sentence was later commuted to life by the Georgia
governor. In response to the governor’s decision, Frank was kidnapped from the
Georgia state prison and lynched. The case, and the men responsible for the
lynching, led to a revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the south.
See Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1927),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1927/03/the-case-of-sacco-andvanzetti/306625/. The Sacco and Vanzetti Trial involved the 1920
Massachusetts prosecution of two Italian immigrants for the alleged armed
robbery and murder of two clerks. Convicted on scant evidence and sentenced to
death, they were electrocuted in 1927. The Massachusetts government
eventually exonerated the two men of all criminal acts some fifty years later.
See Daren Salter, Scottsboro Trials, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALABAMA (Nov. 21,
2013), http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1456. The Scottsboro
Trials involved the 1931 Alabama prosecution of nine black boys for the alleged
rape of two white women while on a train from Chattanooga, Tennessee into
northeastern Alabama. After a local lynch mob was held off by the National
Guard, the boys were hastily convicted and sentenced to death. Three appeals
and four trials later, the verdicts never changed. Eventually all nine were
pardoned by the governor of Alabama.
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as a failure, “a legal lynching,” 353 and “a tragedy of the American
South.”354 In a practical sense, it surely was. But could the argument
not be made for victory? Thurgood Marshall says it was. While
racism, hatred, and bigotry exist in all corners of the globe, it was
America’s unique constitutional system that ended the Groveland saga
with the proper result. Walter Irvin’s successful appeal resulted in a
second trial and a stay of his execution, and both he, and Charles
Greenlee, were ultimately released from prison having been pardoned
by the governor. Only in a legal system founded on a multijurisdictional appellate process, one that encompasses both federal and
state machinery, would these results be possible. That system is then
woven into our three-branch system of constitutional government,
each with a measure of checks and balances upon the other. Only
through this unique, multi-level form of legal restraint could justice
have been ensured. While certainly too long and too costly in the
making, could it not be said that the end result of the Groveland case
was a win for justice, and a win for the American system of
jurisprudence? Groveland’s historiography remains silent on this point,
but its transcripts and court files scream to be heard on the matter.
Or, if we are to assume, as Groveland’s historiography always has,
that Groveland was indeed a legal failure, then who is to blame for this
tragedy? The number of possible scapegoats is many. Blame could
equally be assigned to any of several parties, or at the feet of the
community as a whole. The Groveland story is ripe with conniving
victims, racist sheriffs, dishonest deputies, partial prosecutors, closedminded jurors, and a community built on prejudice. Perhaps Judge
Futch is less to blame than the history books might say.
We may also be wise to look for a new middle ground when we
look at Groveland. While much of Groveland’s story took place in the
glare of the public forum, two of Groveland’s turning points took place
on desolate, darkened roads, far from any objective witnesses. What
happened on Florida State Roads 50 and 19 may never be known, but
the truth generally lies somewhere between the two extremes we find
on the record. Criminal cases are rarely as simple as total innocence, or
total guilt. Perhaps Walter Irvin and Samuel Shepherd did commit
some offense that night on State Road 50. Perhaps they did make the
Padgett’s victims of something –carjacking, robbery, harassment?
353
354

See generally CORSAIR, supra note 7.
Lawson, supra note 12, at 25.
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What of the fact that Willie Padgett might have found out that one of
the Groveland Four was his wife’s lover, and the rape story was a
simple cover-up? Maybe she had taken another black man as her
lover? Maybe Willie had taken to violence against her again? And
maybe Irvin and Shepherd did try to escape from Sheriff McCall when
he pulled his car onto the side of State Road 19? Like the darkened and
cloudy skies that often cover the central Florida geography, this is a
story likely made of several shades of gray. While legal analysis is
always more comfortable working in the shadows of uncertainty, the
historiography of Groveland has yet to consider the fact that perhaps
neither side is telling the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Until it
does, the study of Groveland will remain a silent witness.
Natural Causes
Since 1952, sixty-three planting seasons have come and gone in
Lake County, and the vast orange groves have continued on nature’s
cycle, unaffected by the ghosts of the Groveland trials. Even as history
marched on, the Groveland saga continued to resurface. Walter Irvin’s
death sentence was commuted to Life in prison by Florida governor
LeRoy Collins in 1954. While announcing the commutation, Governor
Collins also took time to denounce the NAACP’s handling of the
case.355 The decision angered Judge Futch to such an extent that he
empaneled a Lake County grand jury to investigate Governor Collins
on suspicion of his being a communist. While his legal authority to
seek such a grand jury probe may be questioned, Judge Futch said the
governor’s acts were subject to review by God and the people of
Florida.356 Somewhat comically, the grand jury concluded that Collins’
commutation of the sentence was an honest gubernatorial mistake, but
returned no indictment as to any criminal acts.357 In 1956, Governor
Collins and his wife rode in a campaign parade in Eustis where they
were accosted by Lake County sheriff’s deputies and Norma Lee
Padgett. Norma Lee screamed at the governor, and asked him if his
decision would have been the same had his wife been the victim.358
She and Willie Padgett divorced in 1958.359
355
356

357
358
359

Id. at 26.
Irvin Reprieve Opens Row: Judge Asks Probe of Governor’s Act, CHI.
DEFENDER, February 25, 1956, at 1.
Entin, supra note 64, at 507.
Lawson, supra note 12, at 24.
KING, supra note 6, at 358.
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Judge Truman G. Futch died in March of 1960, and the news of his
death was covered in The New York Times.360 A quick summary of the
Groveland story formed the lead topic in the article. 361 Charles
Greenlee was paroled in 1962, and Walter Irvin was paroled in 1968.
One month later, upon returning to Lake County for the first time in
nearly 18 years, Walter Irvin was found dead in his vehicle. Having
spent the last 20 years in custody, he had been back within the borders
of Lake County for only a few hours. Sheriff McCall declared Irvin’s
death one of natural causes. Even McCall’s most ardent supporters
found such a coincidence alarming.362
Published at his ranch outside Umatilla six years before his death,
even Willis McCall’s own autobiography contains only one chapter
detailing his version of the Groveland narrative. 363 In the Umatilla
church that housed his 1994 funeral, the seating conditions were
standing room only,364 and the city of Orlando’s chief of police served
as a pallbearer. 365 Before his death, McCall said “[he] never killed
anyone who didn’t deserve killing.”366 In the 1980’s, by unanimous
vote, the Lake County commission renamed Lake County Road 450A,
Willis V. McCall Road.367 In October of 2007, by unanimous vote, the
Lake County commission removed McCall’s name from County Road
450A.368
Currently, other than the laws that governed its proceedings, much
of the Groveland story sits unaffected by time. Two other members of
the Futch family have served as judges in Florida’s fifth circuit.
Despite a reward for information and several state and federal
investigations, Harry T. Moore’s assassination is still one of Florida’s
great, unsolved cold cases. Charles Greenlee is still alive, but he lives
far from Groveland, and he has not stepped foot in Lake County since
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Truman Futch, 68, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 1960, at 21.
Id.
KING, supra note 6, at 359.
See generally WILLIS V. MCCALL, WILLIS V. MCCALL, SHERIFF OF LAKE
COUNTY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1988).
CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 377.
Id.
KING, supra note 6, at 357.
Ritchie, supra note 51, at 1.
Id.
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his conviction date.369 To this day, there is no reference, by sign or
memorial, of these events in Lake County. 370 With the courtroom
adjourned, Groveland is still searching for its voice.

369
370

CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 379.
See generally JOHN LEWIS AND JIM CARRIER, A TRAVELER’S GUIDE TO THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Harcourt, Inc. 2004).

